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Textual Harassment: A New Historicist Reappraisal of
the Parol Evidence Rule with Gender in Mind

Abstract
This year marks the four hundredth anniversary of the Parol Evidence Rule, the rule that
dictates that the interpretation of a written contract should be determined solely according to
its text and not influenced by prior contradictory external information. This article uses the
occasion to offer a feminist perspective and a fresh interdisciplinary view of the Rule. The
analysis presents a unique contribution to the heated debate regarding the desired levels of
formalism and textualism in present-day contract law, by using New-Historicist tools.
Unexplored aspects of the roots of the Rule are illuminated through an in-depth investigation
of the first case of the contractual Parol Evidence Rule, the Countess of Rutland’s Case
(1604). To examine this Case, the article suggests the use of “Legal New Historicism” –
researching both human and non-human “actors” who played a role in this Case, and renarrating the story of Isabel, the Countess of Rutland. This method reveals, for example, rare
maps and romantic stories which lead to a critical look at the Rule’s total exclusion of
context and helps to expose its gendered nature.

The article further presents a close reading of the most influential paragraph in Sir Edward
Coke’s report of the Case. Coke’s words and phrasing, it is proposed, should not be read as
incidental choice of language, but rather as carefully planned and, as such, reflective of the
dominant values of the legal culture within which they were written. It is further argued that
the choice to exclude the context is far from a mere omission. De facto it can be seen as
actively creating and then taking into account a manufactured context – one that does not
exist and is deeply patriarchal. An exploration of the political and cultural contexts of
Coke’s report explains the possible motives for establishing the Rule and phrasing it in such
manner. It is argued that the Case played an active role in Coke’s efforts to strengthen the
diminishing status of the Common Law, in the face of increasing threats, as a component of a
marketing project aimed at improving the Common Law’s image without significantly
changing its content.

Along the way the first Case is paired with an almost-twin contemporary case, which resulted
from a Hollywood scandal, Clark v. Hannah-Clark (2003). Based upon the juxtaposition of
this new legal narrative of Nicolette (Hannah-Clark) with the older story of Isabel (the
Countess of Rutland), it is concluded that the flaws and biases underlying the Rule remain
acute and call for a serious reconsideration of its justification. In this way the article offers an
original and, hopefully, useful argument against excessive formalist textualism in present-day
contract law.
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Nicolette
She lost her home.
The judge simply wrote that she “has no interest in that property”,1 but for her it was not
merely “that property”. It was home, the place where she had lived for more than ten years,
ever since her son was born, and she did have an interest in it– the father of her son gave it
to her.
So she appealed but failed again.2 Neither the legal logic of this final decision nor its
description of the facts could be reconciled with the full story she knew too well. Yes, of
course, she worked “for John and Lynn, husband and wife, taking care of their young
daughter”,3 but no, that was not the reason she lived at the little cottage nearby their house.
Why hadn’t the Judge mentioned the undisputed fact that she lived there because John, who
once was her boss, became her lover and the father of her child? Why is there no word about
John’s manifest insistence that she and their son live close to him while he kept his marriage;
no mention of his frequent visits to the cottage?
And what about the period of time when she had to move out from the cottage until “it was
improved with a paint job, a new carpet and a new heating and air conditioning system” due
to its “bad condition”?4 Despite the decision’s phrasing, this period (“between May 1997 and
July 1998”) was not simply a break in her continuous stay at the cottage. It was precisely this
break that later led John to make an effort to bring them back, and it was in order to bring
them back that he made a deed transferring the cottage to her. As even his wife Lynn told the

1

The quote is taken from Judge John H. Reid’s words in Clark v. Hannah-Clark, Case no. SC063529 (not
published) at the Superior Court of California, County of LA (Jan. 11 2002).
2
Clark v. Hannah-Clark, Case no. B157749 (not published) at the Court of Apeal of California, Second
Appellate District, Division 3 (Decided on May 22 2003 by Klein, Kitching and Aldrich).
3
Ibid, opening line of the decision.
4
The quotes are taken from John’s brief that was submitted to the appellate court on November 22nd 2002 in
response to Nicollete’s opening brief.
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court, and as John himself admitted, the cottage was transferred to her “by grant deed dated
July 24, 1998” and John did this in order “to continue his contact” with Nicolette and their
son and “to prevent them from moving out again.”5 They moved back to the cottage, this
time as its owners.
So if the cottage was hers, how then did she lose it? Well, as both John and Lynn told the
court, it turned out that gifting the cottage had severe tax consequences for John.6 Upon
realizing his error, John asked for Nicolette’s cooperation: he requested that she give the
cottage back to him, promising to transfer it back to her again in a different method, by
“creating a trust for [their son’s] benefit and placing the [cottage] in that trust”.7 And indeed
on December 1998, trusting John, Nicolette returned the cottage to him – by deed – only five
months after it was given to her.
He did not fulfill his promise about the trust.
She did not have it in writing.
And that is how she lost her home.
Introduction
There is an ongoing and heated debate in contract law regarding the value of formalism
which entails loud calls for New Formalism.8 Part of this debate raises the question of

5

The quotes are taken from section I(c) (“statement of facts”) of Lynn’s brief that was submitted to the
appellate court on November 22nd 2002.
6
In John’s own words, taken from his written response to Nicollete’s opening Brief: “When John’s accountant
pointed out that this transaction raised a huge gift tax bill, John then planned to take the house back before the
end of the year, and transfer it in the new year to his son [the name is omitted] by way of a tax free irrevocable
trust.”
7
The quote is taken from Lynn’s brief, supra note 5.
8
See, e.g., Avery Wiener Katz, The Economics of Form and Substance in Contract Interpretation,104 COLUM.
L. REV. 494, 499-500 (2004) (“in recent years the debate has intensified; in the field of contracts, this new
debate has increasingly been conducted in the language of the economic analysis of law. This flourishing of
scholarship has followed in the wake of a wider school of thought that some have labeled the ‘new formalism.’
What is new about this new formalism, both in contractual scholarship and elsewhere, is that it attempts
explicitly to ground formalism in functional terms; it tries to show how formal methods of interpretation help to
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textualism:9 to what extent should the written version of the transaction be adhered to
(formalism) – to what extent is there a place for considerations of fairness, distributive justice
and so forth (anti-formalism)10 The greater the formalist-textual position is, the stronger the
belief in adherence to the parol evidence rule becomes,11 and vice versa.
In this study I will illuminate unexplored aspects of the parol evidence rule, in a manner that
challenges and undermines the formalist-textual position from a new angle, namely a New
Historicist one. This unique point of view provides innovative ammunition for the argument
that excessive formalism may injure the weak – and that, therefore, a more flexible and
inclusive approach is required.12
I first read the story of Nicolette losing her home as it was represented in the “official”
judicial texts of both the initial and the appellate decisions. It was a disturbing story, at least
for a reader with a feminist chip on her shoulder,13 like me. Back then I did not know a thing

forward practical goals such as efficiency, procedural fairness, and public accountability.”); Robert E. Scott,
RELATIONAL CONTRACT THEORY: UNANSWERED QUESTIONS A SYMPOSIUM IM HONOR OF IAN R.
MACNEIL:The Case for Formalism in Relational Contract, 94 NW. U.L. REV. 847, 851 (2000); David
Charny, FORMALISM IN COMMERCIAL LAW: The New Formalism in Contract, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 842
(1999).
9
See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Of Textualism, Party Autonomy, and Good Faith, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1223 (1999); Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of
Contractual Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 533 (1998); Stephen Ross and Daniel Tranen, The Modern
Parol Evidence Rule and Its Implications for New Textualist Statutory Interpretation, 87 GEO. L. J. 195 (1998).
10
See, e.g.,Alstine, Id.; Peter Linzer, Rough Justice: A Theory of Restitution and Reliance, Contracts and Torts,
2001 WIS. L. REV. 695; Stewart Macaulay, Relational Contracts Floating On a Sea of Custom? Thoughts About
the Ideas of Ian Macneil and Lisa Bernstein, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 775 (2000); John E. Murray, Jr., Contract
Theories and the Rise of Neoformalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 869 (2002).
11
The phrase “parol evidence rule” (or in short “the rule”) is used here as a representation of the idea that the
terms of a written contract are not to be varied by extrinsic evidence. For a more elaborate account see, for
example, Alstine, Id. at 1231-1241. The nuanced meanings of the rule are far beyond the scope of this piece but
I think the complexity is elegantly captured by words written more than one hundred years ago with regard to
the rule: “Few things in our law are darker than this, or fuller of subtle difficulties.” J. Thayer, The ‘Parol
Evidence’ Rule, 6 HARV. L. REV. 325, 325 (1893). However, one qualification seems necessary: despite the
broad acceptance of the textualist nature of the parol evidence rule, the rule also excludes textual evidence
predating the integration of the written contract. I thank Prof. Gerald Frug for this clarification.
12
See, e.g.,Macauly, Id. at 800 (“To the extent we ignore custom and courses of dealing and performance, we
reinforce the power of the formal written contract. This, in turn, reinforces the power of those who draft those
documents, usually the lawyers who represent those with superior bargaining power.”).
13
Here I am using Mary Joe Frug’s categorization in tribute to the influential ideas that have outlived her. See:
MARY JOE FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM 57 (1992). For some of the feminist concerns see infra note
115.
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about the parties involved, or about the Hollywood scandal that resulted from these deeds. I
did not realize that “Lynn” is actually the celebrated actress Lynn Redgrave, or that “John” is
the Hollywood producer John Clark.14 It just sounded rather peculiar, even unbelievable, that
according to the law all that happened was the transfer of a $317,000 cottage as a mere gift
followed shortly thereafter by the “cancellation and returning”15 of that same gift. Many
questions came to my mind, but two of them were truly troubling: first, was it really a gift
and second, did she actually mean to return it?
As to the first question: the first deed specifically emphasized that John “received nothing in
return”.16 Is this a truthful declaration? It might be true if you are thinking in strictly
monetary terms. It might be sincere if you are willing to ignore the value of a beloved son
who lives nearby, as part of your family, a son that without knowing of your blood
connection was taught to call you “papa”.17 As the jewel in the crown of the market place,
contract law is known for its obliviousness to non-monetary aspects of life. I was therefore
annoyed but not surprised to learn how easy it was for the judges to embrace this narrow
definition of contractual consideration and, as a result, to adopt the wording of the first deed
as the whole truth and nothing but the truth: that the transfer of the cottage was an honest
representation of a gift. Yet, this might be considered a marginal issue, since neither of the
two courts decided the case on the merits of that first deed.18 They both were willing to
assume that for a short while Nicolette did indeed become the owner of her home. It is

14

The much-published Hollywood scandal might make the story more titillating but it could also give us a clue
as to the power disparities between the parties in this Case.
15
This was the statement of the second deed as quoted by the appellate court, supra note 2.
16
The quote is taken from the court’s decision, supra note 2 (citing the deed).
17
John’s brief, supra note 4.
18
The appellate decision, supra note 2, ends with the following words: “The [second] deed is dispositive
because Nicolette therein reconveyed her interest in the property. Therefore, it is unnecessary to address any
contentions by Nicolette relating the [first] deed.” (emphasis added)
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therefore my second question and the second deed that turned out to be crucial: had she or
had she not intended to return the gift to John?
I read the appellate decision again and found out that Nicolette had tried to argue that the
cottage was never meant to be returned to John. I also read how she was immediately
silenced. The legal tool that was used to silence her emerges in footnote number 6 of the
appellate decision:
“We observe Nicolette’s claim that she deeded the property back to John in
December 1998 in exchange for his promise to transfer the property in trust to their
son raises an issue as to the parol evidence rule. As indicated, the December 1998
deed indicated it was a cancellation and return of gift which is inconsistent with
Nicolette’s position that she deeded the property back to John in exchange for his
promise to transfer it to their son.”19
I was startled by the strict way the parol evidence rule enabled the courts to twice read the
written documents so narrowly and to ignore the details of this salacious story. Just as the
courts interpreted the first deed as a gift for nothing, here again they strictly followed the
written words of the second deed. The result was, to my eyes, a legal tale that was in fact a
castrated story; so many details were left out that it made no sense at all. My response was to
search for more information and to try to fill in some of the holes of this “Swiss-cheese”
story. This is why I started to look for the parties’ briefs; this is how I learned that no one, not
even John, denied that what the courts viewed as a simple cancellation of a gift was in fact a

19

Id. Note that this application of the parol evidence rule is especially significant in light of the fact that
California is most known for what Posner named a “soft parol evidence rule” (roughly that of Corbin and the
Second Restatement of Contracts), as opposed to hard parol evidence rule (roughly the Williston, four-corners,
plain
- meaning approach), see Posner, supra note 9, at 534-538. See also, Susan J. Martin-Davidson, Yes, Judge
Kozinski, There Is a Parol Evidence Rule in California - The Lessons of a Pyrrhic Victory, 25 SW. U. L. REV. 1
(1995).
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much more complicated arrangement, one that wholly contradicted the final conclusion that
Nicolette “has no interest in that property”.20
In their use of the parol evidence rule, the courts seemed willfully to ignore the voices that
were trying to tell them what had actually happened. They disregarded not only the interested
testimony of Nicolette but also those declarations that had come from the opposing end of the
field, from both John and Lynn. As far as the second deed was concerned, all three sides of
this “romantic” triangle repeated the same story. They all told how, despite the words of the
deed noting a cancellation and return of a gift, it was obvious that at the end of the day the
cottage was not supposed to revert to John but instead to be transferred by trust to Nicolette’s
and John’s son. Naturally, each of the parties had their own explanation as to the motives that
caused John to break his promise to create a trust,21 but it was agreed by everyone that the
words of the second deed never reflected what was truly happening: everyone but the courts,
that is. The courts were thus utilizing the parol evidence rule as a means of reshaping reality.
One might think that the use of the parol evidence rule as a legal tool for preferring
contractual text over a fuller context is a good idea, and one might say that Nicolette is just a
sad instance of a failed litigation. I just could not: I was concerned by the missing and
misleading story, and I began to ask myself where and when such a rule was born and
decided to “hit the road”. My initial intention was to go back in time in order to better
understand the past of the parol evidence rule. Ultimately, the journey became much more

20

Quoting, again, Judge Reid’s words, supra note 1.
The most elaborate version may be found in John’s brief to the appellate court, supra note 4. Refraining from
using a lawyer as a lingual mediator, John informed the courts in a very expressive manner of many events that
ultimately were left out of the judicial decision. One of these events was the emergence of a new amorous
relationship in Nicolette’s life. John was apparently extremely upset by the appearance of this new man, which
he refers to in a telling way as his plumber, and his brief includes unrepeatable remarks about the race and the
alleged criminal history of his rival. Lynn’s brief to the appellate court, supra note 5, supports this hypothetical
motive for John’s behavior adding that “Sometime in 1998, Nicolette began her relationship with Ernesto, and
John did not like it…There was a barrage of angry “love” emails between John and Nicolette in December
1998…”
21
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complex and intriguing. I return with a novel perspective, one which proves how
contemporary the far past can be. What comes next is therefore a report of my journey - a
journey to the roots of the contractual parol evidence rule, a journey not yet taken by others.
The goal of this report is to provoke fresh reconsideration of the aging parol evidence rule.
In the first section I describe the journey’s itinerary and elaborate on my use of New
Historicist and feminists methodologies. Having done this, the actual journey begins and the
second section focuses on the Countess of Rutland’s Case (the “Case”) that is considered to
have established the parol evidence rule exactly four hundred years ago, in 1604. This part
tells two versions of the Case’s story: first the formal and thin account, and then a thicker
description of what appears to have happened. An analysis of the significance of the
remarkable disparity between these two versions concludes the section, highlighting the
gender bias that is entailed in the legal decision to ignore the thicker version, i.e. the context.
The third section offers a close reading of the most influential paragraph in Sir Edward
Coke’s report of the Case. Coke’s words, I suggest, should not be read as incidental choice of
language but should instead be seen as carefully planned and as such reflecting the dominant
values of the legal culture within which they were written. Accordingly, the fourth section
focuses on the political and cultural contexts of Coke’s report. Here, Coke’s words are read
in light of his broader legacy and in line with his other writings about the law in general and
contract law in particular. Considered in this way, the Case can be seen as playing an active
and productive role in Coke’s efforts to resist the amassing threats to the Common Law: the
admiration of Roman law, the use of oaths, and the need to distinguish law and lawyers from
the common people. Building on this idea, I propose that the Case can be viewed as a
component of a marketing project aimed at enhancing the Common Law’s popularity by
offering a new and improved image of the same old product without significantly changing
10

its real identity. A comparison between Coke’s marketing efforts and the labors of
Shakespeare’s Portia to gain authority in court wraps up this section emphasizing the
artificial nature of the parol evidence rule. The conclusion calls for a serious reconsideration
of the rule’s necessity after four hundred years of an unveiled attempt to exclude real-life
from the contractual interpretation process.
I. THE JOURNEY’S PLAN
A. Taking the New Historicist Trail
My vehicle during this journey is going to be a New Historicist one. For most scholars “New
Historicism” is a literary practice aimed at interpreting literary texts with culture in mind.22
Although used outside of the fictional arena, most famously by the anthropologist Clifford
Geertz, whose works on “culture as text” inspired the literary New Historicist high-tide,23
New Historicism is seldom used in legal works.24 While I strongly believe that what I here
name “Legal New Historicism”25 is a promising critical method, I think that its rarity

22

With Stephen Greenblatt as the acknowledged founder and his book RENAISSANCE SELF-FASHIONING: FROM
MORE TO SHAKESPEARE (1980) as the book that is considered to have initiated New Historicism in literary
studies.
23
Much of this inspiration came from Clifford Geertz’s celebrated book THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES
(1973). The nature of this inspiration defies chronological order. As explained by the New Historicists
Greenblatt and Gallagher: “It is a tribute to Geertz that it was not his method that seemed powerful to us (after
all, that method was in part borrowed from literary criticism), but rather the lived life that he managed so well to
narrate, describe and clarify.” See CATHERINE GALLAGHER & STEPHEN GREENBLATT, PRACTICING NEW
HISTORICISM 28 (2000).
24
For the general argument that New Historicism is seldom used in legal works see Penelope Pether, Measured
Judgments: Histories, Pedagogies, and the Possibility of Equity, 14 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LIT. 489, 520 (2002).
For exceptions see, as examples: Hendrik Hartog, Pigs and Positivism, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 89; Hendrik Hartog,
Mrs. Packard on Dependency, 1 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 79 (1988); W. Fisher, Texts and Contexts: The
Application to American Legal History of the Methodologies of Intellectual History, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1065,
1084 (1997); Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trails of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-Century
South, 108 YALE L. J. 109 (1998) (and the works mentioned there in footnote 23).
25
Fisher, ibid, used the name “New Historicist Legal History” – a phrase that neatly grasps his view of the
method as part of the larger field of “legal history” on which he focused in his article. Since I see the critical
potential embedded in this practice I prefer to name it in a way which will also allow a wider legal use,
including outside the legal-history arena. Compare also to Binder’s and Weisberg’s view: “Instead of seeing the
"cultural criticism of law" as simply an application of New Historicism to law, we can see both developments as
aspects of the emergence of a broader interdisciplinary field of "Cultural Studies" which blurs the boundaries
between the humanities and the social sciences, viewing the phenomena studied by social scientists (including
historians) as social texts available for interpretation and criticism” - Guyora Binder and Robert Weisberg,

11

necessitates further development and discussion. Nevertheless, at this stage I will resist the
temptation to do so and instead try to better explain my specific choice to apply New
Historicism to the contractual parol evidence rule.
First, the rule seems to the American legal mind as a given, and although many have spent
time debating its extent, only a few have questioned its very existence. My turn to New
Historicism is therefore an attempt to focus on this latter question of existence. Here, this
practice can offer the option of de-familiarizing what is taken for granted by taking a closer
look at the times of birth and the critical moments of emergence, the transference from nonexistence to existence.26
Second, despite its procedural name, the parol evidence rule influences the substantive
question of contractual interpretation. Such interpretation becomes highly textual as the rule
bans unwritten data, and the interpretative tool of New Historicism therefore seems
especially appropriate to the project at hand. Highlighting this linkage between interpretation
and the New Historicist practice, Geertz noted in a recent interview:
“When I work in the field on anything, whether it’s something sort of airy-fairy like
religion or something more concrete like a market, I start with the notion that I don’t
understand it. Then I try to understand it better by tacking back and forth between
large and little things. And that’s what you really do when you “interpret”.27
The main object of interpretation in this paper is the Case, where it is believed the parol
evidence rule was “born”. This Case serves, in New Historicist terminology, as the “textual
unit” or as the “cultural text” under investigation. I use the legal report of the Case in a way
SYMPOSIUM: THE CRITICAL USE OF HISTORY: Cultural Criticism of Law 49 STAN. L. REV. 1149, 1150
(1997).
26
This “closer look” has been described as “something akin to what in optics is called ‘foveation’, the ability to
keep an object (here a tiny textualized piece of social behaviour) within the high-resolution area of perception.
Foveation in cultural interpretation is rather difficult because of problems of both scale and focus. The
interpreter must be able to select or to fashion out of the confused continuum of social existence, units of social
action small enough to hold within the fairly narrow boundaries of full analytical attention, and this attention
must be unusually intense, nuanced, and sustained.” GALLAGHER & GREENBLATT, supra note 23,at 26.
27
John Gerring Interview with Clifford Geertz in QUALITATIVES METHODS 26 (Fall 2003).
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similar to Geertz’s use of his own field reports: as a textual unit, “an imaginative act”, a
“made, composed, fashioned” thing,28 one which is no less suitable to literary criticism than
the fictions that are part of the literary western canon. Indeed, the way Geertz, as an
anthropologist, interprets his exemplary texts (his notes) is parallel to the way the legal
reporter interpreted a legal case in England four hundred years ago. Both the anthropologist
and the reporter can be compared to writers and the texts they composed can be read as
“embedded in the cultures from which they come” and as texts that “possess within
themselves more and more of the culture’s linked intentions”.29 My aim is thus to offer a
“thick description”30 of the legal report that brought us the contractual parol evidence rule,
and to attempt to understand the imaginative universe within which the act of reporting this
case was a sign.
Third, a critical look at the parol evidence rule, with its insistence on the autonomous nature
of the contractual text and its rejection of non-textual materials, requires critical tools that
address the specific phenomenon of textuality. Again, New Historicism seems apposite, for
its roots lie precisely in strong resistance to literal criticism which rigidly adopts a highly
textual approach, namely new-criticism. The New Historicist focus on anecdotes as a
powerful vehicle in the search for meanings, in plural, seems extremely useful here: these
anecdotes constantly cross and blur the lines of relevancy, lines between inside and outside,
center and margins, main and subordinate, lines which the parol evidence rule so fiercely
tries to establish and maintain.

28

GALLAGHER & GREENBLATT, supra note 23, at 27-28.
Ibid, 25.
30
The term “thick description” is not about the length of the description. It comes from the philosophical works
of Gilbert Ryle who in his essays on thinking used it with regard to description which “entails and an account of
the intentions, expectations, circumstances, settings, and purposes that give actions their meanings.” See ibid at
23.
29
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Fourth, it is meaningful that the parol evidence rule was founded in the last days of Queen
Elizabeth’s reign and the first days of King James’, the early-modern times of Tudors and
Jacobeans. This period, with the plays of Shakespeare at its core, served as the nursery for
the development of literary New Historicism, 31 and thus could naturally be revisited by the
same method – this time with law, instead of literature, in mind.
Last, and apropos Shakespeare, New Historicism gives various texts the ability to converse,
to participate in the cultural discourse of their time. It is under this New Historicist umbrella
that I offer this kind of conversation between the chief text – the 1604 legal case – and
Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice. To use the words of Catherine Belsey, the fictional
text of Shakespeare could “offer definitions and redefinitions which make it possible to
reinterpret a world we have taken for granted.”32
These five factors I have just outlined join together in one typical New Historicist desire, and
that is to explore the ways in which the old long-forgotten textual unit that engendered the
parol evidence rule was both culturally produced and culturally productive. This desire is
grounded in the belief that New Historicism “entertains the possibility that any social or
political document can be read not only instrumentally but also aesthetically, as describing

31

In addition to Stephen Greenblatt’s book, supra note 22, which is considered by many to have initiated the
movement, many more New Historicist works with relation to the same period may be found. See Generally: H.
ARAM VEESER, ED., THE NEW HISTORICISM (1989). For more examples see: Walter Cohen, Political Criticism
of Shakespeare, in SHAKESPEARE REPRODUCED: THE TEXT IN HISTORY AND IDEOLOGY (Jean E. Howard &
Marion F. O'Connor eds., 1987); JONATHAN GOLDBERG, JAMES I AND THE POLITICS OF LITERATURE (1983); The
Politics of Renaissance Literature: A Review Essay, ELH 49 (1982), Recent Studies in the English Renaissance,
in STUDIES IN ENGLISH LITERATURE (1984); Stephen Greenblatt, Invisible Bullets: Renaissance Authority and
Its Subversion, in POLITICAL SHAKESPEARE (Jonathan Dollimore & Alan Sinfield eds., 1985), SHAKESPEAREAN
NEGOTIATIONS (1988); Richard Helgerson, The Land Speaks: Cartography, Chorography, and Subversion in
Renaissance England, REPRESENTATIONS 16 (1986); Jean E. Howard, The New Historicism in Renaissance
Studies, ENGLISH LITERARY RENAISSANCE 16 (1986); Louis A. Montrose, Of Gentlemen and Shepherds: The
Politics of Elizabethan Pastoral Form, ELH 50 (1983); Edward Pechter, The New Historicism and Its
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the cultural forces that underlie its production and as reinterpreting cultural forms and
norms.”33

B. Turning onto the Feminist Path
In western culture and since the days of the Odyssey a journey has been a masculine
undertaking: Odysseus went away and Penelope, well, she waited at home. So my planned
journey is in itself a feminist method. But in what other ways is a New Historicist journey
connected to feminist voyages? I think it all starts with the use of “anecdotes” against the
hegemonic order of things,34 as a way of producing counter-narratives. To grasp this
subversive spirit, listen to the New Historicists describing themselves by saying:
“…the undisciplined anecdote appealed to those of us who wanted to interrupt the
Big Stories. We sought the very thing that made anecdotes ciphers to many historians:
a vehement and cryptic particularity that would make one pause or even stumble on
the threshold of history.”35
For feminists seeking ways to expose and resist male dominance, which is often so axiomatic
by nature, these words represent a powerful potential. No wonder that “some of the legal
scholars most interested in the promise of New Historicism are feminists.”36
Feminist works37 and New Historicism share not only the impulse to resist hegemony, but
also elements of methodology.38 Among these are the tendency to avoid grand theories, the
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attempt to refrain from abstract models and a zealous search for “the touch of the real”,39 the
connection to lived experiences which are patronizingly excluded under the general rules of
hegemonic disciplines. These are the methodologies I will now attempt to employ.
II. THE COUNTESS OF RUTLAND’S CASE
A. The Thin Version
The Countess of Rutland’s Case is considered to be the origin of the contractual parol
evidence rule.40 According to this belief, the rule was born in 1604, making it exactly four
hundred years old. A good occasion to celebrate, but also a suitable time for reconsideration.
Even though the general principal that emerged from the Case was much quoted and is –
actually – still quoted until today,41 few are aware of its particulars.42 One main reason for
this is that the reports of the Case provide an extremely brief and slim description of what
had happened, what was pleaded and what was decided.43 The first and better known report,
written by Sir Edward Coke, is less than two and a half pages long44 and the second, written
by Sir George Croke, is even shorter – only half a page.45 However, the length of the texts is
not the only problem for someone who seeks the legal story with its specifics. Croke’s text
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does not tell us the facts at all and concentrates only on the legal principals upon which the
Case was decided. Yet, even through Coke’s longer text – which states the facts – one finds it
hard to grasp what the Case was all about, especially when trying to read this text today,
from a distance of centuries. Other than “technical” barriers to the modern reader, such as the
use of Law-French, “a totally artificial language”,46 it seems that the text itself is cryptic to
the point where it is almost incomprehensible. It is a report of a case that refrains from telling
us, perhaps refuses to tell us, a story.
The little that is possible to know from simply reading Coke’s report is that Isabel, the
Countess of Rutland and the widow of Edward, the 3rd Earl of Rutland, sued Roger, the 5th
Earl of Rutland. At the heart of these legal proceedings stood a manor called Eykering House
and additional land of unclear nature named the “Lady Park” – both located in “the county of
Nottingham”. It appears from the thin description in Coke’s report that the Countess blamed
the Earl “for breaking her house and close”, but no further details are provided regarding this
occurrence. There is no hint as to the nature of this breaking but, at any rate, we are informed
that the Earl’s response was “not guilty”. We are then told (in a very complicated manner)
that the dispute between the Countess and the Earl arose from a conflict between two written
contracts that were both made by the late Edward Earl of Rutland with regard to the property,
i.e. Eykering House and the Lady Park. In the first contract Edward covenanted (contracted
by deed) with several trustees that he would convey to them the property in order to ensure
his own and his wife’s use of the property, during their life together. The covenant went on to
say that if he, Edward, died first – his wife, Isabel, would have the right to use the property
for the rest of her life. According to this covenant it was only after the Countess’ death that
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the property was supposed to fall into the hands of Edward’s heirs, who where represented by
Roger, the current Earl of Rutland.
More than half a year later another written contract was made by the same Edward. This later
contract dealt with a much larger parcel of land which contained many properties including
Eykering House. This time the list of trustees was longer and they were supposed to make
sure that the specified lands, including the disputed property, were transferred in male-tail
only, which means from Edward directly to his male heirs without any rights whatsoever to
be given to Isabel the Countess.
With regard to Eykering house and the Lady Park the question was thus which of the two
contracts should govern: the first, which would enrich the Countess, or the second which
would supplement the current Earl’s fortune. Importantly, the witnesses’ testimony came into
the picture not as an independent source of information separate from the writings, but as a
support for one of the two rival documents. As Coke’s report tells us:
“…it was proved by diverse witnesses that the said Earl Edward…told them, that the
said countess should have the manor of E[ykering] for her jointure.”47
It appears that no one knows for sure whether Isabel, the Countess, or Roger, the Earl, won
the Case. What is known through the reports is only the directory to the jury made by the
judges. Chief Justice Popham, together with “all the court”, was reported by Coke as setting
the general rule that a written deed will bar parol evidence. The reasoning was, in Coke’s
much-quoted words, that:
“…it would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on
consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the
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parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain
testimony of slippery memory.”48
Ironically, the first parol evidence rule’s case was not decided upon this general rule and in
fact the jury was instructed to hear the witnesses despite the presence of a written deed. The
reasoning behind this outcome has its roots in the Early-modern legal way of conveying land
and is difficult to explain based solely on Coke’s report alone. In the early 17th century the
declaration of a trust was only the initial step in the process of gaining the landowner’s
control over the future of his properties. In order to finalize the transaction a further (and
crucial) step was needed. Edward, the grantor of the property should have, in Coke’s words,
“acknowledged” his obligation to the trustees and the beneficiaries by executing a suitable
“fine”. A fine was an artificial and fictional legal practice in which the grantor of the land
was sued by the people who were supposed to receive it. In practice, such a suit was not
litigated but instead a settlement was achieved and approved by the courts. In order to
constitute a valid contractual obligation this settlement had to be congruent to the primary
deed and that is exactly where the two deeds of our Case failed. Although Edward did
“acknowledge” both his first specific deed and his second more general one, on two
consecutive days, it seems that “the fines actually levied were inconsistent with either
deed.”49 Presumably it was because of these special circumstances that the judges decided to
allow parol evidence.50 However, as I note above, the Case is better known for its setting of
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the general rule forbidding the parol evidence than for its concrete conclusion to allow such
evidence in the dispute resolution at hand.
To sum up the thin version of the story, we could say that Isabel and Roger held
contradicting documents that gave each of them the exclusive rights to Eykering House (and
the Lady Park). Isabel had in addition several witnesses to support her claim and the court
allowed hearing them as an exception to the more general rule that it had just made: the parol
evidence rule. This is indeed a poor story: who are these people, what were they fighting
over, and why, what is (or at least might be) the explanation for such great inconsistencies
between the legal devices? In the next section I will try to deal with these questions by
sketching a thicker version of the story.
B. A Thicker Version
1. The Main Characters
In constructing a thicker version of the Case, I will first focus on its three main characters.
Viewing both humans and non-humans as active “actors” in the emerging plot, I will then
continue with the disputed land itself, and conclude the review, briefly, with two additional
minor characters.
I will open with Isabel, the Countess of Rutland who gave the Case its name. However, it is
worth emphasizing that researching a female figure, especially one from the Early-modern
times, is a much more complicated task than collecting information on her male counterparts.
a. Isabel Manners
Isabel was born in Vale Royal in Cheshire on an unknown date, to Juliane Jennings and
Thomas Holcroft.51 As such she did not originally belong to the English aristocracy of her
51
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time,52 a fact of great importance to our story. Isabel joined the nobility via her marriage to
Edward Manners, the 3rd Earl of Rutland, on 1573, by which she became the Countess of
Rutland. While married to Edward, Isabel enjoyed a luxurious life. She resided mostly in the
lavish Belvoir Castle – the residence of the Earls of Rutland back then and the seat of the
Dukes of Rutland in our time. Her journey to London with her husband in 1586 involved
“forty-one servants, including a chaplain, trumpeter, gardener and apothecary.”53
In 1575 Isabel gave birth to her only child – a daughter named Elizabeth – who according to
the rules of the period could not be the heir of most of the family’s estates. The fact that
Isabel and Edward had no male heir to inherit most of the family’s properties created a
serious and ongoing conflict between Isabel, who outlived her husband, and his male heirs.
So bitter were the relationships that Edward’s younger brother John (Isabel’s brother in-law),
who became the 4th Earl of Rutland, tried to prevent her from receiving what was clearly
promised to her under her late husband’s will – claiming that the huge payment for Edward’s
funeral should first be paid in full out of her share.54 Isabel had to sue her brother in-law and
seemed to have won, if only partially, when the issue was decided by arbitrators, including
Lord Burghley, an important figure in our thickening story. John’s revenge was to try to take
from Isabel the custodial rights over her young daughter, maintaining that her bourgeois
ancestry made her an unsuitable guardian for a great lady. Evidently, Edward’s male heirs
were extremely unhappy about his decision to marry Isabel, especially since they had to
support her throughout her widowhood after she contributed little, or nothing, to the family’s
fortunes. However, it is quite clear that it was the lack of a son that required Isabel to fight so
52
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desperately for her rights; just as she had to do later – in the Case we are dealing with –
against John’s son Roger, the 5th Earl of Rutland.55

b. Edward Manners
Edward Manners, the 3rd Earl of Rutland, was born in 1549 to an aristocratic family and was
the eldest son of Henry, the 2nd Earl of Rutland. When he was 14 years old his father died
and he was made one of the Queen’s wards under the close charge of Lord Burghley. It was
this powerful man who took care of the young boy’s fine education in “Oxford, Cambridge
and possibly Lincoln’s Inn”56 and indeed Edward was later described as a learned man and a
profound lawyer. His legal talents were so remarkable that the Queen appointed him, on
April 12, 1587, to the distinguished position of Lord Chancellor, a title he held for only a few
days until his sudden death. During his life Edward showed both business skills and
administrative abilities and the Earldom of Rutland was described as flourishing under his
hands.57
A salient feature of Edward’s profile was his decision to marry Isabel. In a society obsessed
with status and hierarchy, as Tudor England was, marriage was a key issue. Far from
contemporary romantic images associated with the idea, marriage had a highly functional and
pragmatic role, especially for members of the aristocracy. What was perceived as “good
marriage” had little to do with love or with the quality of the relationship of the spouses;
instead it was more about social rank, political power and, above all, property. The decision
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whom to marry was seldom a matter of individual choice but rather a crucial part of a
familial strategy. One major objective of such family planning was, to use Lawrence Stone’s
words, “the acquisition through marriage of further property or useful political alliances.”58
In other words, in those days of “arranged marriages” it was not only the groom marrying the
bride but, in a sense, his whole family marrying the bride’s family.59 Other than the obvious
aspirations to promote the family’s status by means of the “proper” wedding, there were two
additional factors that played a role in shaping this familial perception of marriage, both of
them tightly connected to our story. The first was the dowry: the considerable amount of
property, or, in its absence, of cash money (“portion”), that had to be transferred from the
family of the bride to the family of the groom in order to facilitate the marriage. In return for
that fortune the bride was guaranteed an annual sum to support her in the event of
widowhood, or a jointure – a term which plays an essential role in the Case. The burden of
financing the daughters’ dowry was heavy enough to make it a rational strategy for the whole
family to cautiously choose its recipient. The wealth and the trustworthiness of the potential
groom’s family were relevant both in terms of the safeguard the jointure would assure the
bride and in terms of the ability of the bride’s family to pay for the marriages of its other
daughters as well.
The second factor was the primogeniture, a principal according to which the eldest son in
each family inherited all its assets. The other children, both daughters and younger sons,
were hence dependant economically on their father and later on his sole heir, their elder
brother. This principal contributed immensely to the importance of the eldest son’s marriage,
since in each family he was the one with the better upwardly mobility chances – he was more
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likely to marry a wealthy bride accompanied by a hefty dowry that would add to the family
assets and would suffice to cover the portions of his sisters.
It was against this concrete background that Edward decided to follow his heart and to marry
Isabel. Taking into account the cultural and economic forces of the period sheds a light upon
such a decision and enables us to better comprehend its meaning. As the eldest son of his
most respected aristocrat family,60 Edward’s marriage was of utmost importance and yet it
appears he assumed the freedom not only to marry far beneath his social rank, but also to
upset his family’s expectations of a substantial dowry. For one thing, this marriage is
presumed to have been considered at the time as mésalliance,61 “a union between two people
that is thought to be unsuitable or inappropriate”.62 More than that, it was claimed by Isabel’s
mother “that the Earl was so deeply in love that he was willing to marry the girl even without
a marriage portion”.63
But Edward’s marriage was more than mere noncompliance with the cultural norms of his
time.64 It seems essential to understand that he preferred Isabel to several other brides, far
more appealing in terms of money and position, and furthermore, had put his very future (and
consequently that of his younger siblings as well) at risk. As mentioned earlier, when Edward
60
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married his father was already long dead and his future as well as all of the family’s estate
was controlled by William Cecil, Lord Burghley, the powerful guardian of the Elizabethan
aristocracy.65 Despite his general obedience to his influential guardian,66 Edward refused
Burghley’s suggestion to marry his daughter, an offer that few would have dared to decline
and many would have loved to take up.67 The exceptional nature of Edward’s decision to
marry Isabel should therefore be viewed in a multilayered way, taking into account its many
dimensions that, combined together, reinforce the impression that this rare marriage could
only have been based upon love.68
c. Roger Manners
The 5th Earl of Rutland and the defendant in our Case was born in 1576 as the eldest son of
John, the aforementioned 4th Earl of Rutland who fought so bitterly against Isabel.69 When
his father died Roger was still under-aged but wealthy enough to induce Lord Burghley to
engage himself in a fierce contest over the young Earl’s ward. This contest was won by
Burghley, previously Edward’s guardian and now entrusted by the Queen with the custody
over another Earl of Rutland, Roger.70 One of Burghley’s first moves as a warden was to
order Roger’s mother, Elizabeth, to send Roger back to Queens’ College in Cambridge,

65

Since Lord Burghley was included in the text of Coke’s report, I will discuss his character in more detail
below. See text next to footnotes no. 99 to 101.
66
Edward is described as one of the most obedient and grateful wards of Lord Burghley, a fact that makes his
refusal to marry his mentor’s daughter even more significant. See STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note
56, at 172-173.
67
He is also reported to have given up other beneficial marriage options: “After negotiations with several other
ladies like Frances Howard (daughter of Lord William Howard of Effingham, later Countess of Hertford) and
Elizabeth Hastings (dau. of Francis, second Earl of Huntingdon, later Countess of Worcester), he married…
Isabel…” DNB, supra note 53, 934. The words in italics do not appear in the DNB and are taken from
http://www.tudorplace.com. It is fascinating to know that it was the same Edward that years later
insisted his daughter to marry upwardly, a command she obeyed by marring Lord Burghley’s grandson, Sir
William Cecil the 2nd Earl of Exeter. STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, Id. at 175 and 177.
68
Additional support for this conclusion might be found in Edward’s will in which he was very generous
toward his widow. See STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, Id. at 175; Crosswhite, supra note 54, at 1133-1134.
69
See the text next to supra note 54.
70
STONE, FAMILY AND FORTUNE, supra note 56, at 177. The fact that this was the second time that Burghley
obtained control over an Earl of Rutland serves as another indication of his deep involvement in the lives of the
Manners.

25

where he was educated for many years. The tension between Burghley and Elizabeth was so
acute that Roger had to ask his permission to visit his own mother.
So different from his talented late uncle Edward, Roger seems to have been a big
disappointment to his mentor, both in terms of education and in terms of business skills.
While tracking the young Earl’s expenses Stone notes: “Though he did buy a Livy, it is
noticeable that it was in translation, and his very limited expenditure on books suggest a
young man of some natural intelligence but who had failed to master the classics and whose
main interests lay elsewhere.”71 Roger was quite adventurous and spent a lot of time
traveling the world, probably more than he could afford himself as the head of the Earldom.
When Roger was not even twenty, and shortly after his mother’s death in 1595, Lord
Burghley approved his journey to the continent – but wrote bluntly that the young Earl knew
very little about his estate.72 It was in Paris, toward the end of his “Grand Tour” in 1597, that
he first met the Earl of Essex, an acquaintance that would have enormous influence on his
life as well as an interesting effect on our legal story.73 Charmed by Essex, Roger followed
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him to the Azores and continued to ignore the rising need for his involvement in his family’s
businesses. In the years that followed, Roger is described as a reckless spender who would,
for instance, pay huge amounts of money for princely clothing. According to Stone, his “rate
of expenditure was almost certainly higher than of any other private individual in the
country”.74 That irresponsible attitude, combined with the need to pay for his sisters’
marriages led Roger and his dependants into a severe economic crisis that lasted from 1601
to 1606,75 significant years in the legal fight with Isabel. There can be no doubt that in those
years Roger found himself under heavy financial pressure. He had to borrow large sums of
money for mortgage and was also quoted as requesting Royal help while stressing “the
weakness of my estate and greatness of my debts”.76
What had deepened the crisis even more was Roger’s involvement in the Essex revolt, for
which he was fined by the Privy Council on May 1601 the enormous sum of £30,000.77 This
incident was not only an economic disaster but also one of Roger’s most serious mistakes
and further proof of his impulsive nature. As I have already mentioned, Roger was one of
Essex’s admirers and close friends, so on February 8th 1601, when Essex called his
supporters for help, Roger did not hesitate and immediately gathered around Essex’s house.
It is worth mentioning here that Lord Essex’ relationship with Queen Elizabeth had just
reached its lowest point ever. Only months after Sir Edward Coke – as one of Essex’s
prosecutors for his Ireland fiasco – dared to blame the Earl for disloyalty, the Queen was
ready to follow him and distrust her favorite Earl. New indications arose and she was now
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even more convinced that Essex was indeed plotting against her.78 The Privy Council sent for
Essex, they had questions to ask. Essex claimed to be ill and refused to come.
“No sooner was the messenger gone than the Earl received an anonymous note,
warning that he was in danger and had best provide for himself. Essex sent out
runners over the city; all night they spread the alarm…”79
It was in response to this alarm that Roger was waiting at dawn in front of Essex’s house,
together with several other Earls and hundreds of gentlemen. He was standing there on this
Sunday morning when a special and much respected mission sent by the Queen arrived at the
courtyard; among them was Chief Justice Popham – the leading judge in our Case. As if to
prove the Queen’s suspicions, Essex led his honorable guests to his library and… locked
them in! He then left home and ran to the streets waving his swords and yelling “For the
Queen, for the Queen!” His aim was the royal palace, but to Essex’s grief not many were
willing to risk themselves and join him and his small group of followers, Roger included.
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After a violent encounter with a few soldiers Essex fled back home by boat, only to discover
that his hostages were gone.
“By midnight, Essex was in prison and his friends captured: the Earls of Southampton
and Rutland; the Lords Sandys, Monteagle, Cromwell; Sir Gilly Merrick…Desperate
men; ruined men, now, scattered in prisons throughout the city.”80
On May 19th 1601 Essex was brought to trial and his prosecutor was none other than Coke,
who bought himself worldly glory through this trial. Preparing himself for his big
performance, Coke wrote himself lengthy notes which indicate how central Roger’s
involvement was perceived to be.81 At a crucial point in the trial Coke called Chief Justice
Popham as a witness and, “Wrapped in the majesty of judicial scarlet, Popham stepped from
the bench and stood waiting for the first question.”82 Popham testified in detail not only about
his traumatic imprisonment, but also about things he heard while crossing Essex’s courtyard
on the way to his house. It is probable, therefore, that he also recognized our Earl of Rutland
standing there on this Sunday morning.83 By the end of this long day of legal hearings,84
Essex was found guilty of treason and was beheaded.
The Earl of Rutland was more fortunate: his life was saved but he suffered a substantial fine,
larger than that of any of Essex’ other followers, a fact that serves as a further indication of
just how seriously his contribution to the plot was perceived. At any rate, based on a gloomy
description of his financial plight this fine was later reduced (to around £20,000); the
remainder was never enforced and finally was cancelled by King James.85
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d. The Disputed Land - Eykering House and the Lady Park
Bruno Latour has explained how non-human objects may play an important role in a story.86
Inspired by such theories,87 it seems valuable to take a detour to Nottinghamshire, England,
where the manor over which Isabel and Roger fought once stood. What was named in Coke’s
report of the Case as “Eykering” is to be found today in Eakring (note the slight change of
spelling) – a village in the center of Nottinghamshire.88 “Eykering” was indeed one of the
several spellings of this place’s name, a spelling that apparently evolved from the Old-Norse
origins of the name as “Eikhringr”, meaning a ring of oaks.89 It is unclear exactly how and
when this property came into the Manners’ hands, but in the Doomsday survey of 1086,
Eakring was listed as Echering and most of the village and its lands were divided between
two manors.90 One of these manors was handed down through the Eakring family, the
Lexingtons, the De Suttons and finally the De Roos family, which merged with the Manners
and became the Earls of Rutland.91
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Most attractive for our purposes is the fact that in 1604 – the year of the Case – Eakring itself
was subject to a special survey performed by a gentleman named Henry Caldecott who, with
the assistance of some tenants of the same manor, drew beautiful plans of the place and its
surroundings.92 This survey allows us a rare peek at the disputed territory as it looked four
hundred years ago; but it does much more: it sheds light on the term “Lady Park” as it
appears in Coke’s report of the Case and it also gives us a serious clue regarding the
unknown result of this Case.

Let us start from the end: The plans that resulted from this survey do not mention Isabel the
Countess of Rutland in any way. Instead, at the bottom of the plan that depicts the manor
itself there appear words of explanation:

hands of the earls of Rutland years later when, in 1539, Gertrud Manners, the eldest daughter of Thomas the
first Earl of Rutland, married Sir George Talbot of the De Roos family. See text accompanying infra note 97.
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“The manoure of Eykringe in the Countie of Notinghm being parcel of the
possessions of the righte honorable Roger Earle of Rutland Lorde of the same
Manoure. Surveyed the fifte daye of Julye. 1604…”
These words, written in the same year as the judicial decision in our Case, suggest that it was
Roger who had ultimately won the legal battle as well as the disputed land.93 Further
evidence for Roger’s victory, albeit less conclusive, is the fact that it was he who sold the
manor to others.94
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Other than “Eykering House”, the manor house referred to in the above quote with its
associated lands, the dispute in the Case concerned an additional item called the “Lady Park”.
It is impossible to know why this “Lady Park” warranted special reference in the Case and
was not simply considered part of the Eykering House, especially since it was close to the
manor house (or ‘Hall’) itself .

However, the same survey from 1604 provides us, literally, with a picture of this mysterious
“object”. This magnificent illustration of the park portrays an enclosed land full of tiny
sketches of trees (oaks?).

As shown in the plan above the Lady Park was adjacent to what is titled in the plan as
“Eykringe pasture leyes” and lay just over a mile from the manor itself. At the lower righthand corner of the plan an economic analysis is offered (reprinted here with no change of
spelling):
33

“The Ladie parke is a woodgrounde, and the wooddes therin are lately solde, sothat
little profitte is to be made thereof by woodsales for manye yeres. Therfore in my
opinion it were good to stubbe the moste p[ar]te thereof & convert it to pasture. So
that thereby present profitte maye be made, And the rather for that it is to be kepte
enclosed continuallye.”
The information provided by this text gives us reason to suspect that due to the sale of all its
wood, the Lady Park’s value decreased significantly during the years between the making of
the indentures and the legal debate regarding their meaning.

Having understood what the “park” was, we now turn to the “lady” that gave it its name. One
of the most appealing and symbolic possible explanations is that Isabel was not the first wife
to receive this land from her husband and that the park was given to one of the Ladies in past
generations as a morning gift, a gift given to the bride by her newly wedded husband in
exchange for her loss of virginity upon the consummation of their marriage.95 One possibility
may be that this part of the estate was given to Gertrud Manners upon her marriage to George
Talbot in 1539.96 Support for this may be found in an indenture made by Gertrude’s father,
Thomas the 1st Earl of Rutland:

“’An Indenture between Francis Talbot, Earl of Shrewsbury and Thomas Manners,
Earl of Rutland, whereby the former leaves to his son George, Lord Talbot, on his
marriage with Gertrude, daughter of the latter, the Manor of Rufford, the Lordship of
Ekeryng, with lands in Rufford, Ekeryng and Kirketon. Co.Nottingham.”97
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Another charming possible explanation for the “lady” in “Lady Park” concerns female deer
hunters. It seems that the term ‘Lady Park’ did not appear until Elizabethan times and may
have referred to the Queen herself. It was accepted that the monarch, invariably a man up
until the time of her sister Mary and Elizabeth herself, took part in the exercise of hunting
and particularly in the hunting of deer. But this was a very physical activity for which a
woman was not considered suited, and so the Lady Park developed whereby Elizabeth – and
her ladies – would sit in carriages and the deer would be driven past them, allowing the ladies
comfortable aim. This became fashionable in Elizabethan times, which could explain why the
name does not appear earlier in Eakring. The Eakring Park was quite small and perhaps
particularly suitable for this type of hunting. Taking all this into account, it is probable that
Isabel hunted in this style in the Rutlands’ Lady Park at Eakring.98

On a more general note, it is interesting that the findings of the 1604 survey seem to indicate
that the overall size of the Eykering House together with its surrounding lands was 1015
acres (including land held by tenants), a relatively modest estate in view of the Rutlands’ vast
possessions at the time.

2. The Minor Characters
a. Lord Burghley
Lord Burghley appears in our story explicitly in the second written indenture, where Edward
names him, among others, as responsible for the transference of a long list of properties to his
male heirs. Indirectly, as we have already seen, Lord Burghley was heavily involved with the
Manners in many ways and hence it seems worthwhile to try and learn more about him. He
was born in 1520 as William Cecil and was highly educated in what was at that time the best
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college in England: St. John’s College in Cambridge. Curiously, in a way that might remind
us of Edward Manners’ marriage to Isabel, he married against his father’s will a woman of
“slender means”99 after the failure of his ambitious father’s plan to prevent this by moving
him to another university.

Cecil would be one of Queen Elizabeth’s chief advisors for decades. Upon her accession to
the throne she immediately made him the Secretary of State – a position he held until 1572,
whereupon he was made the Lord Treasurer until his death in 1598. Despite the fact that
Elizabeth was not generous in creating new peerages,100 she raised her loyal advisor to the
peerage in 1571 giving him the title of Lord Burghley - a decision that reflects well the
power he gained in the days of the Elizabeth’s reign. Lord Burghley is often described as the
most influential man in the Elizabethan era.101 In the context of our story it may be
enormously important in understanding the audacity and impact of Edeward’s decision to
refuse to marry this dominant man’s daughter, as well as the extraordinaryand to the high
value of the eventual marriage of Edward’s daughter to Burghley’s grandson.102

b. Gilbert Gerard

Sir Gilbert Gerard’s name appears on both of the contradictory indentures, a peculiarity that
did not escape Coke’s attention.103 It is important, thus, to explore Gerard’s connection to the
Manners and the legal skills he brought to his responsibilities under these documents. In this
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regard it is significant to learn that Gilbert Gerard and Isabel were first-cousins: his mother,
Margaret Holcroft, was the sister of Isabel’s father. In addition, his co-trustee to the first
indenture was Thomas Holcroft, Isabel’s brother, who is mentioned in our Case as Edward’s
“brother” for being his brother in-law.

Furthermore, Gerard had a fine legal education in Gray’s Inn and his legal reputation was so
exceptional that Elizabeth nominated him to the influential position of Attorney-General
soon after her accession.104 Thirty seven years later she would nominate Coke, the reporter of
our Case, to the same influential position.105 In 1581 Gerard climbed another step up the
legal ladder of the times and was appointed Master of the Rolls – an office he held until his
death in 1593.

3. Wrapping-up the Thicker Story: the Outlawing of Context

The thicker story I have tried to sketch above adds some context to the slim text of the report
of the Countess of Rutland’s Case, a context so absent from Coke’s description. Going back
to the central question of the two conflicting indentures made by Edward Manners, it now
seems more evident that the context of the Case could loudly speak for the first indenture,
which promised the land to Isabel. The indications are numerous and I will only point out a
few: Edward, a very talented and experienced legal professional, took the legal effort of
making a specific indenture that was dedicated to Eykering – one relatively small and
marginal property among the many assets of the prosperous Manners family. For the
purposes of this indenture he particularly chose respected trustees from his wife’s family and
104
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entrusted them to make sure that his beloved wife, for whom he was willing to risk so much
during his lifetime, should have an adequate jointure for her widowhood. He did so knowing
that he had no son and that his wife would therefore most likely be dependant upon the
mercy of his male heirs. He calculated that these heirs could not be trusted to care enough for
his wife’s welfare, not only because the responsibility for jointures was viewed in those times
as an economic disaster, but also because of his heirs antagonism towards Isabel because of
her inability to contribute to the family’s fortunes upon their marriage. The choice of
Eykering of all the family’s properties can be seen as a conscious decision on Edward’s part
– Eykering being a not-too-important asset, but still one that could provide a decent income
for his widow, for instance, thorough the sale of wood from the Lady Park and the collection
of rent from tenants.

We can not be sure, of course, but it well may be that the fact that Edward included the same
property of Eykering House and the Lady Park in the two different – and conflicting –
documents was simply a mistake on his part. In light of Edward’s vast legal and business
talents, such an error seems more plausible than the possibility that he consciously created
conflicting indentures. All of the above circumstances would seem to support the supposition
that he never meant to include this special property in the later and much more general
document.

In this same context, we can also find support for the possibility that Roger’s fight over
Eykering did not necessarily arise from any solid belief in his legal right but from a desperate
economic situation and an urgent need to get rid of an excessive burden of jointures.106 Given
all the indications as to Roger’s general irresponsibility, it does not seem implausible to
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assume that his “breaking” to Isabel’s house was a hasty attempt to deal with his financial
crisis by making use of the presumed weakness of his widowed rival.

The gap between the story that Coke told us and the thicker version of the story as presented
here is remarkable. This gap emphasizes the terse nature of the legal report and suggests that
its slimness was intentional. A possible response could point to the general manner in which
law reports were written in Coke’s times.107 This kind of response would, of course, explain
the fact that Coke’s text is indeed oblivious of its context. But, as I will now argue, Coke’s
text does not only refrain from the context but it also consciously and bluntly resists it.

Coke’s text could and indeed should be read as a text about texts: their importance, their
supremacy and their desired reign. Of the two reporters of the Case it was only Coke who
reported Judge Popham to say:

“Also it would be inconvenient, that matters in writing made by advice and on
consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the
parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain
testimony of slippery memory.”108
These words reflect much more than a pro-textual approach and upon close reading their
anti-contextual attitude is evident. The alternative to the written text is the unreliable
“slippery memory” of witnesses, and an apocalyptic warning follows:

“And it would be dangerous to purchasers and farmers, and all other in such cases, if
such nude averments against matter in writing should be admitted.”109
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From this choice of strong words such as “dangerous” and “nude” it seems that the author’s
purpose is to elevate the text to sanctity and to eliminate entirely any other contradictory
information. We can grasp the deliberate effort made here to outlaw context if we remind
ourselves of the facts of the Case, which involved two incompatible documents and not a
clash between a written text and competing (risky) testimony.

One immediate lesson that can be learned from the thicker version of the story, the one that
includes context, is that at the beginning of the seventeenth century the act of establishing a
legal rule that crowned text and expelled context was a truly hegemonic act. Back then the
contractual text was totally inaccessible to women,110 and it was only the wider context that
had the potential to disclose their gendered reality and inferiority. Concerning the availability
of the texts of contracts to women in those days, several points are worth mentioning: First,
women were in general far less literate and educated than men. Second, women’s literacy
was confined for the most part to the well-to-do women, and those who were lucky enough to
be able to read were usually directed to readings of “female-literature” such as romances,
plays and poetry.111 Third, needless to say there was no way an early-modern Englishwoman
could earn the legal education that would enable her to comprehend, let alone write, a
contract. And fourth, once married a woman could not even be a passive side to a contract,
for instance by signing it without reading it, since according to the rule of coverture she had
no legal entity of her own.112

This last point brings us directly to the gendered impact of rejecting context. Not only
insignificant details were left out by focusing only on the text. Rather, as Isabel’s Case
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beautifully demonstrates, it was for the most part the patriarchal nature of the story that was
excluded: Isabel’s inability, as any other married woman’s inability, to hold or control
personal property, necessitating third-party contractual arrangements; the difficulty in
enforcing these arrangements and fulfilling the intent of a husband who sought to bypass
patriarchal inheritance rules in order to secure the future of his wife; the strong resistance to
brides who could not bring along hefty dowries; and finally, the need to fight for jointure
lands against powerful male heirs of the patriline. Hence, shaping a rule that decidedly gives
the text ultimate control over the interpretation of the contract/s at issue had, even if
unknowingly, a strong patriarchal meaning.

To get a better sense of this patriarchal nature of the Case we can attempt to track Isabel’s
voice. She is first silenced due to her absence from the contractual text as a result of her
marriage and her mergence into her husband’s person. She then gains a distinct voice as a
plaintiff through her new status as a widow, that allows her to appear in court and, as a result,
in the report’s text. But still, her voice could not be heard since the English seventeenth
century law of evidence excluded the parties themselves from the witness stand.113 Instead,
others, namely the “diverse witnesses”,114 speak for her and they represent her voice as
coming from outside the text. And here is the catch: their voices, which are a poor variation
of hers, are ridiculed as the unbelievable result of their “slippery memory”.

From a contemporary perspective the above analysis may produce two chief conclusions
regarding the nature of the parol evidence rule. On the one hand, we see how the rule was
“born in sin”, as Coke’s text about the supremacy of contractual texts did indeed create a
chauvinistic act. On the other hand the historical reality that made the rule so female113
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excluding to begin with has so changed by the beginning of the twenty-first century that one
might argue that what was born in sin is now purified and hence sustainable. But is it?115 To
address this question I feel I should go smaller116 again: to the details of the text that
supposedly constituted the parol evidence rule and then to the specifics of its creation.

III. CLOSE READING OF THE TEXT

One specific paragraph of Coke’s report has been quoted repeatedly through the centuries
and indeed has been seen as constituting the modern parol evidence rule. As these words
have remained influentiallong after the litigation that led to their writing was forgotten, it is
important to look at them more closely:

“…it would be inconvenient that matters in writing made by advice and on
consideration, and which finally import the certain truth of the agreement of the
parties should be controlled by averment of the parties to be proved by the uncertain
testimony of slippery memory. And, it would be dangerous to purchasers and farmers,
and all other in such cases, if such nude averments against matter in writing should be
admitted.”117
Several characteristics of the newborn rule are evident even from its wording alone: its
aspiration to separation, its hierarchical nature, its alleged rationality, its claim to certainty
and its pro-market orientation. Together, as I will now further explore, these characteristics
115
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portray a highly masculine profile, based upon common stereotypes of men, while alienating
traits which are usually (and, again, stereotypically) associated with femininity.118
A. An Aspiration to Separation
By separation I mean the assumption that the written text of the contract can and should be
separated from all that surrounds it. The above quote from our Case divides the world into
two groups: the first is “matters in writing” – a phrase which appears twice in this short
paragraph – and the second group – also appearing twice – is that of “averments”. It is easy
to see what “matters in writing” are, given the very tangible nature of the written words; it is
much more difficult to grasp what stands against it, under the title “averments”. Literally the
last term refers to the action of proving the truth, and etymologically it comes from Latin
(adv r re) and French (avérer), which emphasize the same search for the truth.119 Legally
the term was reserved for a formal offer to prove a line of facts, to verify what was pleaded.
Confronting “matters of writing” with “averments” suggests that the two groups are indeed
separable: there are indisputable facts that are part of the written text and there are other
alleged facts that need to go through the process of averment; there are “solid” facts that are
included in a “matter in writing” and there are “fluid” facts that exist in the “slippery
memory” of the witnesses. Since the rule quoted above bans the second type of facts, the
fluid facts, it seems that a separation between the solid and the fluid is inherent to it and
defines its very essence.
But, the separation is not that simple. Just consider, for instance, the fact that the trustees of
the first indenture were Gilbert Gerard and Thomas Holcroft. Since these names were written
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in the indenture itself, they can be seen as “solid” facts that come from a “matter in writing”.
But what about the family ties of these two trustees to Isabel the Countess of Rutland? As we
saw earlier they were her relatives, obviously a fact that might support her claims. But what
kind of fact is that? Fluid? Solid? On the one hand, the family ties are not part of the written
text, but on the other hand the name Thomas Holcroft is written and might be connected
easily to the Countess’ maiden name, which is not written. Are we facing an averment which
is going to be rejected under the new rule or are we in the realm of “in writing”? Or perhaps
Holcroft’s connection is part of the written text while Gerard’s ties are only a fluid fact?
The same question arises regarding the “Lady Park”. The name of that property was almost
certainly written on the first indenture, but its use as a hunting place for ladies probably was
not mentioned. Is it enough that the word “lady” was written to make its special meaning a
matter in writing – or is this contextual information too fluid and therefore in need of
averment? As these brief examples illustrate, the division at stake is not that natural and is
more a result of a conscious and somewhat arbitrary effort.
The ability to separate “matters in writing” from other facts that require averment stands at
the base of a rule that suggests forbidding such averment. Still, it is worth noticing that it also
works the other way around: a legal system which adopts such a rule is aspiring to separation
and thus declaring its strong belief in the positive value of separation.
A closer look at the tendency to separate things and to divide them into disconnected groups
might expose a gendered facet of the rule.120 The general argument is that the very attempt to
draw strict borderlines and build high walls between concepts correlates with masculine
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stereotypes. Such attempt is based upon a belief that the ability to separate one thing from
another is a human achievement and a sign of development. A further underlying belief is
that through acts of disconnection we will find ways to better control our lives, by organizing
them in neat and independent categories.
Fundamental ideas that shape western culture support and reinforce the linkage between
maleness and the capability of creating a separation. One legendary instance is Sigmund
Freud’s theory concerning the stages of development of the human personality. According to
this theory boys deal with their Oedipal complex by separation: the boy represses his
libidinal impulses toward the mother and detaches himself from her. Freud draws a
connection between this crucial separation and the boy’s competence to develop his superego. Problematically, but nevertheless with enormous influence on our culture, he then goes
on to claim that boys enjoy a moral superiority over girls who remain entangled in their own
Electra complex without a similar separation ability that would enable them to resolve it.121
In contrast to this masculine image, women are not identified with the trait of separation.
From cultural feminism we have learned that women do not perceive themselves, their tasks
or their experiences as isolated units. Motherhood, as a leading example, pushes women to
do just the opposite – to combine – and not to separate – their spheres of involvement: career,
parenthood, and so forth.122 Radical feminism is known to respond sharply to this argument,
and maintains that such description of women is not their nature, but rather a symptom of
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their weakness and inferiority: male power perpetuates its control over women, among other
methods, by describing them as incapable of the correct and admired way of thinking – that
is, thinking that distinguishes and separates.123 However, despite this disagreement the
feminisms are united in their objection to the idea that separation is attainable and valuable.
Applying this critique to the separation at hand, as done under the parol evidence rule, it can
be argued that the attempt to distance text from context and “matters in writing” from
“averments” presents a masculine model. Dealing with the messy information that might
shed light on the contract’s interpretation by arbitrary categorization of its pieces is not
necessarily a sign of intellectual or moral development. Indeed, it is an indication that the
chosen model suffers from a lack of feminine qualities.

B. A Hierarchical Nature
The dichotomies of text/context or “matters in writing”/”averments” entail not only a dubious
separation but also an evident hierarchy. The written text is placed high above the “other”
pieces of information. Such positioning is made clear by the text quoted earlier in two ways:
by praising the superior term and by condemning its lower counterpart.
As to the praise, the text symbolizes clearly which of the dichotomized possibilities we
should trust. The most conspicuous signifier is the association of the “matter of writing” with
the word “truth” - and not just with a simple truth but with a “certain” one. Indeed the
uplifting label of “certain truth” is so powerful that it is almost unnecessary to look for other
signifiers. However, the characterization of writing as “made by advice and on
consideration” powerfully suggests how thoughtful the process of writing is and hence how
clever is its result.
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The element of condemnation of “averments” involves several signifiers. The first is quite
hidden and might work unconsciously – the inferior end of the hierarchy does not even have
a name. As we saw earlier, the term “averments” covers something ambiguous defined only
as the negation of what was put in writing, something still waiting to be proved. The lack of a
name is meaningful when the question of dependability is at stake – how can one trust that
which has no name? The namelessness is a representation of nonexistence and it directly
leads to the desired conclusion, i.e. that these “averments” should be ignored.
Second, the text seems to verify our understanding of the hierarchy by using derogating
signifiers as well. In contrast to the “certain truth” which produces the “matters of writing”,
the averments are “uncertain” since they result from uncertain testimony.
Even though this would be more than enough to clarify the order of things to the reader, the
text provides a third indication by stressing that the uncertainty derives from “slippery
memory” – a disparaging term particularly in the context of the comparison with “matter of
writing”; in Coke’s “lexicon”, as well as in others’ texts, “slippery memory” was frequently
used as an antonym of fine legal writing and indeed as a means for advocating writing as
well as printing and publishing.124
The fourth “hint” regarding the bottom of the hierarchy emerges from the use of the word
“nude” to describe the averments. In legal archaic language “nude” meant unattested,
unconfirmed, unproved.125 In a narrower contractual context it bore the even worse meaning
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of being void due to lack of consideration unless made by written deed.126 In any case, to say
that the averments are “nude” clearly adds to their characterization as undependable.
And finally, the vertical view of the relationship between the written and the unrecorded is
further strengthened by the less general words that precede the words that are quoted here,
words which clearly portray a ladder:
“…if other agreement… be made by writing, or by other matter as high or higher,
then the last agreement shall stand; for every contract or agreement ought to be
dissolved by matter of as high a nature as the first deed.”127
That a hierarchical rule is of a hegemonic nature needs little elaboration. As many feminists,
from different strands of feminism, have claimed before – women tend to be the systematic
victims of hierarchal thinking and are usually associated with the lower end of each
fundamental dichotomy that constitutes the western culture. In leading dichotomies such as
normal/strange, subject/object, main/marginal, active/passive, culture/nature,
rational/emotional, strong/weak, public/private, autonomous/dependant, and so on, the
female stereotype is echoed by the second, less appreciated side of each pair.128 Whenever a
dichotomous separation is defined, the human instinct responds with vertical arrangement of
its parts. Furthermore, many times creating such a vertical arrangement and defining the
supremacy of one of the items in each pair is indeed the initial motivation for distinguishing
the favorite item from its surroundings to begin with. Applying this analysis to the dichotomy
at hand, we can instantly observe the phenomenon in action in Coke’s text: in the
dichotomies of certain/uncertain, truthful/deceitful, solid/fluid, written/oral and covered/nude
– as in the many other dichotomies mentioned before – the female stereotype correlates with
the second item in each pair, the less valued, the less trustworthy.
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C. An Alleged Rationality
What did Coke mean when he wrote that it would be inconvenient to let matters in writing be
controlled by averment? To address this question it is important to realize how frequent and
intentional the legal use of this word was.129 Coke used inconvenient to mean inconsistent130
and preached for a consistent rule of law, a rule that adheres to its internal logic. Ideally such
a rule would be based upon general reason, would offer a broad solution which could apply
to most cases, and would better serve the public interest. The use of inconvenientthus
represented flinching from reasonableness. It also worked the other way around to signify
that avoiding such inconvenience would lead to a continuous possession of reason as well as
to its preservation. In a world which defines rationality as the “the quality of possessing a
reason; the power of being able to exercise one’s reason” staying away from the inconvenient
meant just that – appearing to uphold rationality.131
That Coke was aware of the risk to concrete justice that is involved in such an approach is
quite clear. His response was that it is better “that a private person should be punished or
damnified by the rigor of the law, than a general rule of the law should be broken…”132 The
use of inconvenient thus represented a fairly rigid devotion to abstract rationality at the
conscious expense of individuals’ concerns.
To say that it would be inconvenient to let the messy reality influence the interpretation of a
written contract is, in fact, to say that dedication to the written is logical and rational. This
129
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raises a gender issue that has been addressed in numerous feminist works. In a nutshell, such
a critique denounces the logo-centricity of law and its artificial mask of rationality. From a
feminist perspective these traits tend to silence and frustrate many women by denying the
value of other means of expression and other sources of knowledge which are not a product
of lingual analysis.
Even at the lingual level the search for the antonym of “rational” is a telling one. Apart from
the obvious “irrational”, such a search would produce words such as: illogical, unreasonable,
foolish, crazy, ridiculous, absurd, silly, unfounded, groundless and so forth. Evidently those
are all disapproving ways of describing what is not rational. However, studies have suggested
that “not-rational” ways of communication are an integral part of women’s lives, as women
are more sensitive to non-lingual symbols such as body language, tone of voice or facial
expression, and indeed tend to use such symbols much more than men.133 While one might
resist the essentialist flavor of these findings, as I do, if only because there can not be one
“women’s way of thinking”, there is still a disturbing point that is worth making here. To
reject proof of unwritten facts as “inconvenient” and irrational means to discard what is
perceived as “feminine” knowledge together with ways of communication that are more
associated with women.134 It is almost needless to note that this was an especially biased
move in early-modern times when the official way of performing rationality, i.e. legal
writing, was not even an available option for women. Critiques of this kind challenge the
dominance of rationality in the legal discourse and call to open legal space for extra-rational
133
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knowledge.135 It seems to me that it is exactly the creation of such a space that was prevented
so effectively back in 1604 by the formation of a contractual parol evidence rule.
D. A Search for Certainty
One reason why adhering to the written is considered rational (“convenient”) is that it entails
or even promotes certainty.136 According to our quoted text, the written document carries the
“certain truth” while the averments are made of “uncertain testimony”. Positioning “certain
truth” against “uncertain testimony” not only suggests the preference for what is written, to
which we referred in the earlier discussion of “hierarchy”, but can be seen as a representation
of the certain as well as a barrier against the deceitful nature of uncertainty. The question
would then be – is this really the case? Assuming certainty is achievable, which is doubtful,
is it necessarily better? Is it in fact truthful?
From a feminist perspective, as well as from a post-modern viewpoint, the answer seems
quite negative. To assume that certainty is so desirable means to believe that we should
struggle to maintain the status-quo. But who is most interested in maintaining the status-quo
if not the powerful who are best served by it and feel comfortable with it? For the weaker
members of a given society, those who yearn for change, it is the status-quo that prevents
hope. For such members their inferiority is certain and the uncertain transformation is what
they dream of.
Certainty, in other words, is valuable for some but not for all. It is valuable not necessarily
because of its “truthful” nature but because of the service it provides for the “haves” at the
135

See, e.g., Paul J. Spiegelman, Integrating Doctrine, Theory and Practice In the Law School Curriculum: The
Logic of Jack’s Ladder in the Context of Amy’s Web, 38 J. LEGAL EDU. 243, 254-255 (1988); Kate Green, Being
here: What a Woman Can Say about Land Law, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECTS
OF LAW 87, 102 (Anne Bottomley ed., 1996) (“Law comes from the whole of human life, not only from the
disembodied intellect.”).
136
And indeed this logic is emphasized through quoting the Case until nowadays. See, for example, the BCCI
decision, supra note 41, in section 54. Compare to Peter Linzer, The Comfort of Certainty: Plain Meaning and
the Parol Evidence Rule, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 799 (2002).

51

expense of the “have-nots”. As a representation of a concrete interest, certainty is not The
truth but rather a partial version of truth, namely the part that was well documented in legal
written terms. From the standpoint of those with no access to the written text there is nothing
attractive about the “certainty” that is gained from adopting it. The tone that praises certainty
is, thus, quite masculine - it holds no acknowledgement of doubt or equivocation and it does
not reflect what the English poet Keats termed “Negative Capability”: the capacity to remain
in situations of uncertainty, mystery and doubt.137
Support for this may come by deconstructing the juxtaposition of writing to averments. When
Coke’s text links writing with certain truth and averments with uncertain testimonies (lies) as
a reason for preferring the written, we could try a “Derrida-like” reversal.138 We could
consider the possibility that the virtue of the certain could be seen as the virtue of the
uncertain and vice versa. What this “upside-down” view can expose is that the certain is no
more truthful than the uncertain, indeed if anything it has the potential of being more
misleading. As a written artifact the certain is usually more tangible than any other source of
information, but it is exactly its “black and white” nature which allows manipulative
planning through editing and revising. The human control of the written distances it from the
authentic happening until it can no longer represent a truth, let alone a certain truth. Indeed,
the very technique of law reporting in which Coke was engaged while creating the dichotomy
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of certain/uncertain confirms this post-modern view: the written report was not the truth but
the uncertain version of the truth, a late interpretation of a specific reporter, and as I will try
to show later on, one which was heavily dependent on and reflective of the reporter’s
personal views and agenda.
To sum up, it seems essential to view the quest for certainty with suspicion; as reflecting
hegemonic motives in portraying as universally beneficial something that actually benefits
only a few. The question of who these favored few are and what gender they belong to will
now conclude this section.
E. Pro- market Orientation
Coke’s much quoted text warned that “it would be dangerous to purchasers and farmers” to
admit nude averments.139 The word “purchasers” probably referred to people who acquire
land or property in any way other than by inheritance, while “farmers” were most likely those
who rent or have a lease of such property.140 Since neither purchasers nor farmers were
directly involved in this specific case it seems that the use of these words was more
metaphoric, reflective of a greater concern.141 What was the danger that Coke had in mind?
Who or what was he trying to defend?
The authentic answer to these questions may not be clear, but it appears that Coke was
making a policy point: things will work better if we adhere to written words and not let them
be subverted by other pieces of knowledge. Exactly which things will work better is
answered by the formula of “purchasers and farmers” – and indeed it seems that their
139
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concerns and businesses were Coke’s focal point. Plainly he was not interested in the way
noblemen or their heirs received their property due to their status, but rather in those who
used contract for exchanging property. Whilst society as a whole was perhaps taking the first
steps of what Maine would much later describe as a long journey from status to contract,142
Coke seemed interested in the contractual tool itself, the one used by purchasers and farmers.
The danger he visualized was in all likelihood the danger of chaos, of never-ending clashes
and contradictions between the written contracts and the oral promises, between the legal
texts and the human contexts that threaten to change their meaning. To enable commercial
activity, to let purchasers and farmers bargain, it must have been seen as crucial to have law
and order, law that maintains the order, law that embraces the written and knowingly chooses
to ignore the surrounding circumstances. This last point is strongly connected to the value of
certainty that was just discussed and it suggests that the first version of the parol evidence
rule should be seen as a “pro-market” act, one that aspires to advance the embryonic market
and to facilitate its operation.143
The view that this was a period of critical transformation from a feudal regime to a more
contractual economy has been argued and contested at length and needs little exploration
here.144 What is important to realize is that gender-wise such commercial motives as
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represented in the text by the terms “purchasers” and “farmers” are, again, truly and highly
problematic. The placement of women outside the admirable spheres of
commerce/business/market and within inferior realms, namely the domestic spaces, is a
phenomenon that has been explored by a number of scholars, in varied contexts.145 Yet, it is
worth repeating the point: purchasers and farmers, who contracted at the core of what was
then “the market”, might have been better off relying on the written words which they could
most probably write and control. Women at the time were most likely not better off. For
them, as the Countess of Rutland’s Case neatly demonstrates, the chances to find the right
interpretation of the contract within the four corners of the written document were very slim.
F. Textual Adaptation of a Masculine Image
To sum up the above five points, it seems that the text itself speaks in a gendered language,
winking at the masculine stereotypes while emphasizing a deterrence from association with
feminine ones. Whether Coke was aware of this impact is highly doubtful, but it may also be
less important. Two other points seem more imperative here. First, the fact that it is this text
that survived through the centuries and has been quoted repeatedly is remarkable. For some
reason Coke’s phrasing “made sense” for generations to come and I think that the reason for
this had much to do with the structuring of gender in our society. The oppositions that were
used, as well as the way of putting things “in order” and under control, probably correlated
and resonated with what was encrypted in the developing modern legal minds. Saying that
the rational approach is better than the irrational one, to use only one example, probably felt
natural and axiomatic – reflecting the way things are without the need to claim how they
should be, just as men are, as a matter of fact, more dominant than women.
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The second point concerns legitimacy and authority. For reasons that I will discuss in the
fourth part, Coke’s goal appears to have been to build a better image for the Common Law. If
one is engaged in such a mission, then describing the law as more masculine-like and less
womanly is a fruitful and powerful rhetoric, one that has the ability to establish authority and
legitimacy.146 It is, to use Stanley Fish’s words, an “amazing trick” that is done by the law –
“its ability to construct the (verbal) ground upon which it then confidently walks.”147

Nicolette

She lost her home.

The year was 2003 and she enjoyed legal personhood and had the ability to be a party to the
contract with John. And yet the contractual texts only described how she received her home
as a gift from John and how, only few months later, she gave it back to him. The judges
treated every other part of her story as irrelevant. But, the decision what is relevant and what
is not is seldom a neutral one. The exclusion of the context by means of adherence to the text
necessarily involves the creation and inclusion of a different context – one which does not
exist in reality. This new imaginary context is loaded with monogamist patriarchal values.

The opening sentence of the appellate decision presents Nicolette as a nanny and declares
that she worked for “John and Lynn, husband and wife”.148 The rest of the judicial text
diminishes the ongoing relationship Nicolette had with John, acknowledging only the most
necessary facts regarding their joint son. Furthermore, the judges tell us how she “and the
146
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boy moved into the [cottage] located near John and Lynn’s home”.149 Notice the sense of
invasion and penetration created by this phrasing. Is it not obvious that as a single mother
with a newborn child (not a boy) she could not do such a thing without, at a minimum, John’s
invitation and Lynn’s silent consent?

Of course the unusual state of a married couple and their children living together with the
husband’s lover and their illegitimate child, for years, could have been seen as a real
challenge to the stereotyped monogamist patriarchal model. However, these special
circumstances were “translated” by the court into the standard patriarchal terms. In the thrifty
judicial text it was emphasized – twice – that Lynn did not know a thing, portraying her
mainly as the betrayed wife. As part of this naïve description we are told that during all these
years Lynn adored Nicolette and John’s son and treated him as her own grandson.150

What an amazing image this extraordinary choice of words creates: the whole unorthodox
situation is normalized by a serene depiction of an even bigger “normal” patriarchal family,
consisting in its adapted state of three generations: grandchildren, parents and grandparents.
In this way the image of a “warm-hearted granny” is added to Lynn’s portrait and further
strengthens the need to protect her from her younger rival, that is, the need to protect
traditional family values.

By suggesting this reading of the judicial decision I intend to call attention to the
manipulative potential of the textual approach,151 and especially its patriarchal content. Just
as a judge in Isabel’s times knew very well that women like her could not influence the
149
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contractual words that controlled their lives, so are judges in Nicolette’s times fully aware of
the disparity of power between a famous and wealthy Hollywood couple and the “nanny of
their daughter”.

The nature of life dictates that the professionals who deal with contracts interpretation do
have the context, or at least a part thereof, in mind. As a result, the refusal to even consider
the context, the conscious choice to ignore it, is more than an omission. De facto it can be
seen, somewhat post-modernly, as actively creating and then taking into account a
manufactured context – one that does not exist. This context assumes, however implicitly, a
reality which all know to be fictitious: as if Nicolette had sat in front of John and, utilizing
her own rich legal and business experience, carefully negotiated, on an equal basis, the words
of her contracts.

I imagine it is still possible to dismiss this disturbing contemporary example, perhaps by
seeing the gendered results of rigid textuality as a mere coincidence. It is this last argument
that pushes me to revisit early-modern England and to revert from Nicolette to Isabel, in
search of an even deeper level of analysis. What follows, then, is a closer examination of the
ideas, theories, impulses and intuitions that informed the establishment of the parol evidence
rule by Coke’s report of the Case.

IV. COKE’S REPORT

To hold Sir Edward Coke responsible for the establishment of the contractual parol evidence
rule requires some justification. After all, he was only the reporter of the Case and as such
might be regarded as merely repeating what the King’s Bench judges, led by Judge Popham,
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had been saying. Yet several reasons suggest that such a narrow view of Coke’s report of
this Case is inadequate.

In the first place, Coke was not just yet another reporter, he was the reporter, and the only
reporter who did not have to attach his name to his volumes of reports: considered to be the
prototype, they were simply called “reports”. He served as a Member of Parliament, Solicitor
General, Attorney General, Chief Justice of Common Pleas, and Chief Justice of the King’s
Bench. Add to this his comprehensive writings about the rules of England – the four volumes
of the Institutes of the Laws of England – and it becomes evident how he came to be known
as the supreme oracle of English law,152 “what Shakespeare has been to literature.”153 In
other words, no other English jurist of his time had gained more authority of the kind needed
to establish new rules of law.

Secondly, we are fortunate enough to have another report of the same legal episode made by
an additional reporter of the period, Sir George Croke.154 According to his report, the ruling
of the Case was based on the more traditional idea of estoppel and not on the novel idea of
the parol evidence rule.155 Contrasting these two reports suggests that it is Coke, more than
the Judges of the King’s Bench, who we should credit with the construction of the parol
evidence rule. Indeed, based on a similar method of comparison – i.e., to an alternative report
regarding the same case – it was argued that the rule in the prominent Shelly’s case “owes its
authority to Coke, not to the decision.”156
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Thirdly, Coke is considered by many to have been the kind of reporter who would liberally
insert his own comments in his reports while “not distinguishing…his own views from those
he was reporting”.157 And finally, and even more generally, Coke was a zealous
representative of a generation of reporters who believed that the historical accuracy of the
report and its faithfulness to the original were less important than the publication of the
“correct” legal doctrine for the purposes of future use.158 As part of this “liberal” concept of
reporting, it was argued that while “reporting” Coke made an effort to place a “substantive
gloss” on the Common Law.159 One of his techniques was to emphasize a general principle
that did not actually serve as the basis for the judgment in the particular nuanced case but
was – at best – part of its obiter dicta.160 This understanding of Coke’s general methodology
appears to fit our Case nicely, since (as mentioned) the general rule he reported does not lead
to the concrete result of the Case.

In light of the four aspects briefly explored above, it seems probable that it was Sir Edward
Coke who developed the parol evidence rule out of the judicial decision in the Case of the
Countess of Rutland. Put succinctly, we can say that Coke had both the opportunity and the
motive to create such a rule at such a time. I will start by exploring the possible motivations
that moved Coke to use his reporting capacity for the purpose of elevating the written
contractual text. As we shall see, the concept which is represented by the parol evidence rule
ties in with Coke’s more general ideas and ideologies in a way that can shed light on both the
rule’s nature and the reasons for its formation.
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A. Elevating the Common Law

“…the common law is the best and most common birth-right that the subject hath for
the safeguard and defence, not onely of his goods, lands and revenues, but of his wife
and children, his body, fame and life also.”161
These famous words written by Sir Edward Coke capture what appears to have been the
prevailing idea that drove his legal work: his boundless belief in the supremacy of the
Common Law over any alternative legal system and his ongoing struggle to strengthen this
superiority and to reinforce the dominance of the Common Law. Coke’s general commitment
to the task of elevating the Common Law is much too expansive and profound to be
addressed here in detail - however, what appears crucial to the linkage between Coke’s work
and the parol evidence rule is the multidimensional way in which his obsession with the
Common Law led him to the battle between the oral and the written: a battle of immense
importance to our understanding of the creation of the rule.

1. The Common Law vs. the Roman Law

In 1571, when Coke left Cambridge to become a student of the law, Roman civil law had
been already adopted by Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Holland, and – most
meaningfully – by Scotland too. The process, also known as the “reception”, generated
considerable legal anxiety in 16th century England. England had not been part of the
reception process and the common view had been until then that the English law should stay
insular and different.162 Nonetheless, we can imagine that retaining a system so manifestly
different from that of the neighboring world might become a tremendously trying experience
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and the source of a great sense of inferiority. Indeed, “on the Continent, the English law was
looked on as brutal”,163 but a critique from within, made in the 1530s by Thomas Starkey,
also condemned the English legal practice as medieval and barbarous.164

The attacks were obviously a source of significant apprehension and produced a defensive
response accompanied by a desire for some assimilation. Calls for legal reform, calls to join
Europe by adopting some version of the Roman civil law, were starting to be heard – and the
idea that England needed a written law was growing out of the combination between two
different schools of thought: Renaissance humanism and English Nationalism.165 In 1535 a
proposal was presented to King Henry III, a “discourse touching the Reformations of the
Laws of England”, written by Richard Morrison. What was suggested was actually writing
the law, and Morison was paraphrased to say:

“What the Romans did the English can and should do. They should write the law,
produce an English equivalent of the Corpus Juris Civilis. Not only would such a
book remedy the law’s confusion and uncertainty, it would stand as a mark of civility,
a mark of England’s freedom from barbarism.”166
This call remained unanswered for several decades. The mission was too challenging and
intimidating. If possible at all, it requires a rare jurist who is shrewd, learned, ambitious,
highly respected, experienced, self-confident, meticulous, and so on and so forth. It was Coke
who had all these qualities (in large quantities) and who took upon himself the lifelong
mission of writing down the laws of England. Other than him “no one had attempted a
picture so comprehensive, legal exposition on so grand a scale”.167 First came his 11 volumes
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of the reports and they were then followed by his four volumes of the institutes: “together
they should represent the whole law of England, spread upon paper for students to learn and
see.”168

Coke wrote for years with “a persistent awareness of a rival system of law against which
English law had to defend and define itself”.169 Moreover, by writing these laws down he
was trying to create a new image for them. No longer would they be the lived memory of
small professional communities; instead, they would become something else: more stable,
more systematic, more approachable and, above all, more civilized. In other words,
something that could compete with the Roman law.

It is worth stressing for our purposes that putting the law in writing was a way of fighting for
the Common Law’s authority. In contrast to the Roman code, here the written result was not
the authentic law, but a strategic representation of the law. The law itself remained oral,
chiefly what the judges had said, for years, in courts. Indeed, Coke himself pointed to the risk
inherent to this oral nature of the English law and explained the importance of writing by
warning against the phenomenon of “slippery memory”. Interestingly, he used this same
phrase again and again, including in our parol evidence rule Case, whenever he wanted to
justify writing. The danger of “slippery memory” was the danger of the “slippery slope”, the
danger of losing authority. So, by mimicking the Roman law technique of writing, Coke tied
the Common Law to one of the most admired characteristics of its rival, and could thus
present the Common Law as the “most equal, most certain, of greatest antiquity and least
delay, and most beneficial and easy to be observed.”170
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2. The Common Law vs. the Oaths

The Common Law was threatened by its “barbarous” image not only because of the
widespread reception of Roman law, but also as a result of the flaws of its own procedures.
Chief among these was wager of law - an archaic procedure, originally used in local courts
all over England and a very popular defense method in cases of unpaid debt. When sued for
not paying their debt, the defendants could ask to “wage” (that is, make) their law by taking
an oath that they do not owe the money or the goods in question. The defendant would then
bring eleven neighbors or friends (compurgators) who strengthened the initial oath by taking
a secondary oath that the defendant is trustworthy and their oath was good. As time passed,
this procedure expanded from the local courts to the central courts in Westminster, where it
became increasingly unfeasible to bring close neighbors or friends to support the defendant’s
claims.171 A fictional practice of using “professionals”, hired oath-helpers, also known as
“knights of the post”, was developed to cope with this problem.

At the end of the sixteenth century and at the beginning of the seventeenth century pamphlets
were mocking the oath-helpers who “will swear you anything for twelve pence”, and the
period’s literature was full of references to the corruption of the knights of the post.172
Dependence upon this old procedure entailed such risk to one’s reputation that even its
classic beneficiaries, the defendants, were increasingly deterred from relying on it.173 Not
surprisingly, the practice of waging the law came at the price of increasing disrespect for, and
diminishing faith in, the legal system that used it and relied on it to do justice. As Lorna
171
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Hutson notes, “In literary texts, the openness of wager of law to abuse became symbolic of
wider corruption in judicial and political systems.”174

The use of oaths at the turn of the sixteenth century was therefore something that needed to
be abolished and it was, again – like writing the law – a mission for Coke to fulfill.175 He did
this by challenging the system of oaths as part of his argument in the famous Slade’s case.
The decision in this case practically eradicated the wager of law.

A keystone of the modern law of contract, Slade’s case, which was litigated during the years
of 1597-1602,176 is known for its legal recognition of “implied promises” arising from a
contract.177 However, as David Sacks pointed out, legal historians tend to agree that the
decision in Slade was at its time mainly:

“a vehicle for accomplishing what the lawyers and judges were really after – namely,
the displacement of the older forms of action in contract with new ones capable of
attracting potential plaintiffs to the common law courts…”178
We will go back to these marketing efforts later, but for now it is important to see more
generally the pains that Coke had taken to extricate the Common Law from the corrupted and
barbarous stigma caused by oaths, and to portray the Common Law as a more rational and
better controlled legal system. In this regard Coke had to address the claim that it was
inappropriate to allow plaintiffs to opt for a procedure that would deny the defendants’
174
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“right” to wage their law. It was argued that this was especially inequitable in situations
where defendants had fulfilled their share in the transaction privately and hence could not
otherwise prove their innocence.179
To this Coke replied that the reliance upon oaths “induces men… to perjury”.180 At the
practical level his argument, albeit cynical, was at once rational, practical and highly
educational: the debtor should obtain a receipt.181 Here, again, we see Coke dealing
pragmatically with the tension between the oral (the private payment) and the written (the
receipt) and preferring the tangible record over the elusive oaths. At the policy level his
argument embraced the King’s Bench modern view that considered the wager of law an
“anachronistic and irrational mode of trial”182 and hence offered a trial by jury.
Whether the trial by jury of the early-modern times was indeed better is highly doubtful,183
but nevertheless what is important to our discussion is that it had the appearance of being
more rational and therefore was considered an improvement. At any rate, the combination of
both the practical level and the policy level of Coke’s response led to the conclusion that the
best, if not the only, way to refrain from being charged for breaching one’s contract is to
present tangible proof to the jury.
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Focusing on the cancellation of wager of law we can see that Slade’s case involves a series
of dichotomies: oaths/jury, mystical/rational, medieval /Common Law, ancient/modern,
corrupt/fair, suspect/trustworthy, etc. Paralleling these dichotomies we can perceive this case
as representing a move184 away from the first element, towards the second element of each
dichotomy. Coke’s practical suggestion – that the debtor should keep documents that could
prove payment – raises, again, another dichotomy, which correlates with the above move, the
one of the oral vs. the written. The “written” symbolizes tangibly the superior term in each of
the above dichotomies: the rational, modern, fair and trustworthy Common Law
, a law which
was wise enough to get rid of the oaths in 1602.

One result of the Slade’s case move was that many more oral contracts could now be
litigated under the Common Law through the action of assumpsit.185 This probably raised a
series of questions about the status of the oral newcomers in relation to the familiar written
contracts.

Was Coke, already occupied by the clash between the written and the oral in the greater
context of the competition with the written civil law, aware that this complication was to
follow from his victory in Slade’s? It is hard to know the answer. However, if he did have
this potential conflict in mind, this might explain why he made such an effort to establish the
parol evidence rule through our Case, even though it was not required given its concrete
facts.

184

On seeing Slade’s case as a “move” as opposed to “mentalité” see Sacks, supra note 178, at 37. As Sacks
argues “moves are highly sensitive to the particularities of the historical setting in which they are made.” `
185
BAKER, supra note 113, at 346.

67

3. The Common Law vs. the Common People

What is to date considered as Coke’s leading contribution to the modernization of the
medieval version of the Common Law is the concept of “artificial reason”.186 The idea was
twofold: firstly, that the Common Law is a product of reason and hence reasonable and,
secondly, that this reason is not natural reason, but something else, artificial and perfect. In
Coke’s famous words:

“Reason is the life of the law, nay the common law itself is nothing else but reason,
which is to be understood as an artificial perfection of reason.”187
The first layer of Coke’s concept placed “reason” at the core of law. Such a view afforded the
Common Law a much-needed unifying method, one that could tie together the dispersed
precedents that had been building up within it for so many years.188 Coke’s definition of the
law as based upon reason provided the judges with a common tool of assessment: “what they
found reasonable, the judges approved; whatever failed to meet the test of reason, they struck
down”.189 This brilliant idea made the law appear fundamentally coherent. All of a sudden
the Common Law seemed to have “common sense”, and with Coke’s brush it was painted as
rational, consistent and logical. Simultaneously, this magical concept increased the judges’
credibility and reliability, for they were the users of the efficient tool of reason and, as a
result, they became the source of reason, its carrier and its reflection. Combined together,
these two improvements – of both the law’s image and that of its judges – contributed
immensely to the strengthening of the Common Law
’s authority.
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It is important to notice that even Coke’s choice to use the term “reason” is extremely
significant. As indicated earlier, we know he was acutely aware of the increasing appeal of
the sophisticated, elegant and classical Roman law. We may assume that being so
knowledgeable and well-read190 he had known the Roman maxim that one should follow
reason rather than precedents.191 This maxim plainly assumes a contradiction between
“reason” and “precedent”. Against this background, Coke – in an act of alchemy – turned
precedent into reason. He took the term “reason” and used it as interchangeable with
precedent: the judicial point of view was reason and following precedents was therefore
reasonable. Looking closely at the choice of the word “reason” (for instance in the above
quote whereby “the common law itself is nothing else but reason”) we can see the labored
effort that Coke made in presenting the Common Law as though it resembled the respected
Roman law without changing its true nature. It was, I maintain, mainly a change of image
rather than a substantive transition.

The second layer of Coke’s idea, the “artificial” part, served as a way of distinguishing legal
reason, reasoning and reasonableness from the more “natural” traits of reason. To Coke
artificial reason was anything but the ordinary understanding of the human brain. It was
artificial in the sense of “man-made”, something that emerges from an extremely
professional process and, to use Coke’s original words, “not of every man’s natural
reason”.192 So different from the normal way of thinking, such legalized reasoning involved,
to use Coke’s words again, “long study, observation and experience.”193
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To view law as defined by artificial reason and artificial reason as reserved for legal
specialists was quite a patronizing move. As Hulsebusch put it, Coke “championed the
“artificial reason” of the legal community above the natural reason of the individual.”194 No
doubt such a vision powerfully symbolized and at the same time reinforced the superiority of
the Common Law and its experts. Yet, such a vision also evidently distanced and rejected the
common people, those who often needed the legal services.

In a way which is meaningful to the connection between the status of the Common Law and
that of writing, part of this distancing project was attained by the use of written lingual tools.
The reasoned law, as written by Coke and others, was written in an especially reserved
language, one which no “ordinary” person could fully understand.195 This strange, if not
secret, language even had a symbolic name: “Law-French”, a name that captures neatly the
condescending character of the “members-only” legal club. Other than exposing the true
demeaning spirit of “artificial reason”, it is worth seeing how such a name also constitutes a
nod to Europe. However, just like writing an English version of Institutions and just like
talking of “reason” instead of using the term precedents, this too was only a cosmetic
maneuver: the words were seldom in “real” French and the content was totally English-made.

As we shall now see, the two layers of “reason” and of “artificial” are important to the
creation of the parol evidence rule. This can be illustrated by a telling example that preceded
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our Case – the well-known Shelly’s case,196 in which Coke’s argument won him enormous
reputation.197 The dispute concerned the interpretation of a contractual formula that was
commonly used in family settlements, in which owners of land tried to control the future of
their estates. Edward Shelly used the formula of to A (himself) for life, then to the heirs of A
in order to pass on his estates (or the major part thereof) to his grandson from his deceased
first son. The problem, however, was that this grandson was not yet born when Edward used
this formula and therefore at that specific point in time Edward’s male heir was still Richard
Shelly, Edward’s brother. Richard’s claim was that using the above formula gave him an
immediate interest in Edward’s estates, one which could not be rescinded by later incidents
such as the appearance of a newborn grandson. The grandson’s counterclaim was that the
transfer only happened after Edward’s death, a time in which he (and not his uncle Richard)
was the closest male-heir.198

What is important, in the present context, is that Shelly’s Case emphasizes the strong
connection between the idea of artificial reason as a locus of legal expertise, on the one hand,
and the interpretation of legal (and specifically contractual) language on the other. Richard’s
elite lawyers creatively emphasized the need to respect Edward’s intention at the time of
writing, which they took as the impartation of an immediate entitlement to his brother.
Opposing them stood Coke, who represented Edward’s grandson and argued for a
“reasonable” interpretation of the legal formula.199 To him “reasonable” meant the way legal
experts of the time would write and read the formula that Edward used. Such an argument
196
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was based on a literal approach to lawyers’ language – a language that became the visible
symbol of their expertise. At a very practical level this kind of “artificial reasoning” ruled out
the thesis of immediate inheritance by Richard and brought Coke’s client, Edward’s
grandson, the victory.

However, what is even more important for the current discussion is that the same reasoning
rejected the relevancy of other understandings of identical language and left out the social,
political or personal meaning of the legal words. Coke’s innovation was at this later level:
although his argumentation followed the old feudal rules and caused the court to reaffirm
them – it carried with it radical change. As Allen Boyer has written:

“This was one of the most significant achievements of Coke’s era, and one of its most
troubling. For the next four centuries, whenever the terms of a legal document
required definition, English courts would apply the private, technical meaning current
among the bar. When construing contracts, courts arrogated to themselves the
construction of disputed terms, refusing to hear what the parties themselves had
meant... Not until the 1950’s, prodded by Lord Denning, would the English bench
once again begin to read documents in terms of the parties’ original intent.”200
From here the stretch to the first version of a contractual parol evidence rule seems quite
easy: if legal documents speak (reasonably) in a professional language, which is so different
from the natural language, then what justification can there be to accept evidence regarding
the parties intentions?

It also seems that the general idea of artificial reason as well as its more lingual derivative
fitted neatly with Coke’s personal nature. Self-described as direct in his speech and a strong
believer in bright line rules, Coke was known to prefer the most literal interpretation possible
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to any legal written material, be it a statute, a will or a contract. His “plain-meaning”
approach to questions of legal interpretation was well connected to his ways of thinking and
talking, which in turn were not lacking their fair share of arrogance.201

In light of our focus on the Countess of Rutland’s Case, it is startling to see how in his report
on Shelly’s case Coke seems to have told his readers much more than what was said in court
and certainly more than what was stated in the actual judgment. In fact he was later blamed
for reporting things “which had never been uttered in the courtroom.”202 The famous rule that
evolved from Shelly’s case, the one concerning the distinctive legal meaning of the
contractual formula, the one that prevailed for centuries, was not to be found in any other
account of the same case.

B. Marketing a New Image

1. Coke’s Efforts

As we have just seen, at the same period in which the Countess of Rutland was fighting for
her land and Coke was writing his “take” on the judicial decision on the matter, the Common
Law, too, was waging its own battle. In this multi-frontier battle Coke acted as if he was the
“Secretary of Defense” for the Common Law – planning and executing the strategies.203
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This lifelong role that Coke took upon himself involved dealing continuously with the status
of written words and their relationship to the authority of the Common Law. As
demonstrated, defending the status of the Common Law – be it against the Roman law, the
oaths or the ordinary people – involved considerable debate regarding the oral/written
dichotomy. It appears that no easy solution was available to Coke, just as there might not be
one for legal scholars nowadays. On the one hand, the Common Law was by its nature oral,
but on the other hand it needed the writing in order to preserve and promote its authority.
This dilemma is well captured in the following paragraph:
“The need

of common lawyers to justify not only the content but the dignity of their

law against the slurs of royalists, civilians, university scholars, country gentry,
merchants, and divines, meant that lex scripta and lex non scripta, writing and
oral/memorial tradition, opposed each other as ideal-typical constructs in debate as
they worked together in practice. Unorganized, unfindable, uncertain, unsteady,
primitive: These charges battered the unwritten common law.”204
What was taking place at the turn of the seventeenth century, including in our Case, can also
be analyzed with postmodern tools. It is possible to say that instead of a pure dichotomy
between the oral and the written, one which entails hierarchy and superiority of the oral, the
two terms related to each other more interactively. The written was becoming more of a
“dangerous supplement”, the “thing” that the oral was so dependent upon for the sake of
preserving its own existence. So, to continue with the postmodern mind-set, around 1604 the
hierarchy could be seen in a reverse way: if the oral needed the written so badly then was it
not in fact the written which set the tone?205 At any rate, the very activity of writing what
originally was of oral nature had an artificial quality, the exact effort that Coke seemed to be
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occupied with when he was writing the law as well as when he was creating rules of law that
dictated the supremacy of writing.

Coke has been described as having engaged in “creating the secular myth of the common
law”.206 In addition, his tactic can be seen as a campaign for improvement of image, one that
was aimed at creating a better appearance for an aging product, an act of marketing. In this
respect it has already been argued that Slade’s case – which brought litigation to the King’s
Bench – was part of a market-driven process.207 This process, it has been argued, came out of
a growing concern on the part of Common Lawyers and judges who felt that they were losing
their business in the competition between the available courts of the period.208 My argument
is broader and slightly more abstract. First, I believe the struggle for the elevation of the
Common Law involved more than purely the narrow worries about personal profits, even
though such concerns – especially in an era of rapid inflation – would certainly create a
strong incentive. And second, by “marketing campaign” I mean something more expansive
than simply offering “attractive deals” (as Slade’s case with its new option of assumsit might
be seen). I suggest a multifaceted change of image that had the potential for long-term
results, far beyond relieving the immediate economic anxieties of the lawyers and judges
involved.209

What was needed under the marketing model, where the product was a legal system and
services, was more credibility, trustworthiness, firmness, certainty, self-control, steadiness,
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and so on. What was required was to get rid of heavy loads of capriciousness, haziness,
instability, irrationality, unpredictability, impulsiveness and the like. Skimming the above
discussions again we can see that Coke did exactly that.

In this light the formation of a rule like the parol evidence rule can be perceived as a
miniature of the larger story of building a new image for the Common Law
. Ev en though a
contract is, philosophically, an unwritten creature, a meeting point of abstracts like minds,
wills or intentions, rather than a tangible document, the parol evidence rule still reflects the
fact that something is missing. By insisting on writing, the rule seeks authority which in turn
derives from the solid image of the written word.

The Countess of Rutland’s Case should be read, therefore, as part of a larger written cloak
that covers the rules of interpretation of contracts. As such it should be read together with its
better known allies: Slade’s case and Shelly’s case. Jointly they were part of one big
campaign, which was aimed at building a newer and better image of the “rule of law” for the
Common Law.
The fact that all these cases belong to Coke’s legacy and are all “contractual” should not be
seen as mere coincidence. In a period repeatedly characterized as based on a “culture of
credit” the demand for contracts and, as a result, for contractual litigation and practical
contract rules, was on the rise, and contract law served as a “testing ground” for the law in
general. In other words, if contracts could be dealt with in a satisfactory manner under the
Common Law, in such a period of need, then the achievement would be much greater and
eventually exceed the contractual arena. It would bring more business to the Common
Lawyers and judges and it would reflect and signify the law’s majestic power of being
systematic, rational, organized, predictable and useful. The success of this marketing
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campaign would represent Coke’s victory, on behalf of his biggest client ever: the Common
Law.

Surely the idea of gender stereotypes did not even cross Coke’s mind at the time, but from a
21st century perspective his defense strategy might be seen as attributing a more masculinelike image to the Common Law while concealing feminine features. Again, but this time
keeping gender in mind, it may be viewed as accrediting stereotypically-masculine qualities
of credibility, trustworthiness, firmness, certainty, self-control, steadiness and so on, while
hiding stereotypically-feminine traits of capriciousness, haziness, instability, irrationality,
unpredictability, impulsiveness and the like. Such an observation raises two major questions
with respect to the move from the “feminine” to the “masculine” as described above: first
about the hegemonic rejection of the womanly qualities of the law and second about the
artificiality of the whole transformation.

The first point is quite straightforward and it was explored earlier when I offered a close
reading of Coke’s heavily quoted text. Being detached, patronizing, authoritative, rational,
commercial and full of certainty, the parol evidence rule may serve as a silencing mechanism
of more womanly voices.

Pertaining to the point of artificiality, to ascribe a more masculine-like image to the Common
Law was an artificial move rather than a deep conversion. To write the precedents, to switch
from oaths to juries and to use artificial reason was to put on a manly mask and clothes that
would hide the more stereotypically feminine sides of the law. When Coke wrote the report
of our Case and formed the contractual rule that gave priority to writings he did just that: he
wrote a play in which the Common Law had the leading role and he dressed the Common
Law as a man.
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2. Portia’s Efforts
Even though he probably did not meet William Shakespeare in person,210 Coke was certainly
familiar with his play The Merchant of Venice, so popular in the years preceding the Case.211
Generally, as Luke Wilson said, it “seems beyond dispute that the meaning of contractual
relations was a matter of particular concern at least roughly at the same time as the drama
flourished in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries.”212 More specifically, at least
one early study of the legal scene in the fourth act of this famous play claimed that:

“If I were asked to name the three men in all England who were most profoundly
affected by Shakespeare’s The Merchant of Venice, I should unhesitatingly name the
following: Sir Edward Coke, Sir Thomas Egerton…and Sir Francis Bacon.”213
At any rate, whether inspired by Shakespearean Portia or on his own initiative, Coke can be
seen to have used the parol evidence rule in a manner parallel to Shakespeare’s use of
Portia’s gender bending.

In The Merchant of Venice, Portia disguises herself as a male lawyer in order to give a
cunning speech, a feat of rationalism, in favor of Antonio, “the Merchant”, against Shylock,
“the Jew”. This disguise – and it alone – invests her with the elevated status of a lawyer, the
respect of others, and eventually grants her the power of persuasion, admiration and prestige.
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Only in the disguise of the “articulated lawyer”, that is to say, of a brilliant doctor of law, can
she determine things with decisiveness. Only as a man, and through “male” intellectual
slyness, can she defeat Shylock, as one who knows. If she had presented herself in her
femininity and spoken through her true, emotional and romantic motives (to save Antonio in
order to recapture her love and new husband, Bassanio) – would she have succeeded? Not
likely. Support for this estimation may be found in Portia’s memorable speech in which she
praises the quality of mercy, a stereotypically female quality.214 Her failure to alter the
interpretation of the draconic loan contract by using a feminine voice, albeit wrapped in a
masculine costume, suggests a view of what the appropriate gender performance is under
law.
The loan bond stated that if Antonio did not redeem his debt, Shylock could claim a fine
consisting of a pound of flesh, “fair” flesh to be cut and taken from Antonio.215 The “lesson”
to be learned from the rejection of Portia’s attempt to call for compassion and benevolence is
that in the interpretation of this commercial contract there is no room for such “soft”
emotions, but rather, only for that which is termed law. Portia uses, then, the only recourse
left to her – she turns swiftly to the written words of the bond and reads them in the most
literal way while employing the shrewdness of linguistic rationale. She holds fast to the
language of the contract and to the principle that all that is not explicitly permitted is,
therefore, forbidden. As the contract manifestly determines that the fine is a pound of flesh,
but does not say that the fine includes blood, Shylock is allowed to collect his debt, but Portia
warns him that he must not shed even a drop of Antonio’s blood, or he will endanger his
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property as well as his life. This sophisticated logical analysis is what finally brings her the
cries of admiration, “upright judge…enlightened judge.”216
Indeed, Portia’s “intellectual” acrobatics are presented to the viewer as the height of legalcontractual ability and as ensuring her professional reverence. Holding to the written words
and speaking about their meaning in a rational manner is offered by Shakespeare as a way of
gaining both authority and success. Is this not the same thing that Coke was trying to achieve
for the Common Law? Is it not what he was seeking while reporting the Countess of
Rutland’s Case? And, lastly, does not Portia as well as the parol evidence rule present an
artificial image of rationalism which conceals something which is far less rational?
Having suggested this similarity it is worth pointing to one major difference between the
writings of Shakespeare and Coke. While Portia’s real identity and motives are well
recognized by the play’s audience, this is not true of the readers of the legal report. In
contrast to theater-goers, these readers might not suspect, perhaps not even today, that the
hierarchical and rigid parol evidence rule entails a disguise that hides the real nature of
contractual interpretation or that of the law at large.
This disparity is quite meaningful and may offer a better appreciation of the legal rule. The
theater-goers not only know very well that Portia is not a man, that she is bending her gender
performance - they are also fully aware of the active effort she is making to hide her true
identity and to pretend to be something that she is not. This act of imitating men – their
voice, their rough steps, their brags and lies and their clothes –217 by one who is originally “a
Lady… fair, and, fairer than that word”218 is significant. It exposes the artificial nature of her
“masculine” speech regarding the pound of flesh. This imitation is completely at odds with
the declared gender conception of the play (which reflects traditional gender stereotypes),
216
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according to which “a maiden hath no tongue, but thought.”219 The effect of the plain act of
imitation hence becomes dramatic: it is converted into an act of mockery and it gains a
subversive meaning. The loud and open simulation turns the rational-logical-linguistic
process of interpretation, as performed by Portia, into a “freak-show” and it exposes (and
presents) its artificial nature.
This imitation, the disguise, purporting to be something she is not, undermines the unity of
the masculine image of the law. It is true that everyone admires Portia for the fact that she
saved Antonio from Shylock’s clutches, but does the deceit not leave us with an unsavory
taste? Is there anyone who senses that the loan contract was indeed properly interpreted?220
The fact that Portia is not a “real” legal expert also reduces our belief in the legal outcome.
Had Shakespeare written about a real doctor of law who interpreted the contract, we would
perhaps have been more trustful. The disguise creates a significant fracture in the rational
legal façade and brings its limitations to the front of the stage, in both senses of the phrase.221
And this, in my eyes, is the most important feminist contribution to the matter at hand: when
a woman imitates a man and acquires a male image, she nevertheless remains a woman. As a
consequence, the image – which is originally an entirely masculine one – is imbued with a
new meaning, one which suggests a critical look at the origin. In other words, there is a
challenging and thought-provoking dimension to the activity of the copycat in a field, namely
the legal one, which was originally designed by actual men.222 The “pretend man”, by her
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very appearance in the men’s arena, exposes the artificial nature inherent in the binary
division into male and female professions, male and female literature, male and female
justice. Crossing the gender lines, even if in disguise, casts a doubting light on the lines’
existence and threatens to erase them. If all a woman needs to do in order to be a man is to
dress up like one, then all of the many filaments built upon the gender images are likely to
collapse.
Returning from Venice to the interpretation of contracts in the real courts of England, we
may now see more clearly the motivations for covering this process with the distinguished
costume of the parol evidence rule. Through these theater binoculars the disguise may be
seen as another act of marketing on the part of contract law in order to sell itself and the
ideological method within which it operates.223 In order to be heard, contract law and
Common Law at large, like Portia, needed to assume the costume of a rational expert. It
seems that Shakespeare and Coke would have both agreed that adhering to the written words
of the contract would serve as the best signifier of such rationality. The fact that Shakespeare
told his audience about the costuming, while Coke hid it from his readers, further supports
the argument that Coke was engaged in a marketing campaign.
Nicolette
She lost her home.
The parol evidence rule ruled out her situation, her hardship, her need to provide for the
future of her only child, her dependence on the man who loved her, her incapacity to affect
imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself--as well as its contingency,");
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the written contractual words. Sure, nothing was personal. It is, after all, so she was surely
told, an established rule, four hundred years old, and back then, in the old days, they did not
know a thing about her, about Hollywood or about gender bias.
And what if Isabel, the Countess of Rutland, could have heard Nicolette’s story? Coming
from a different age she probably could not really understand what the term “gender bias”
means or even what gender is, but she surely could tell Nicolette so much about her
experience: her hardship, her need to provide for the future of her only child, her dependence
on the man who loved her, and, lastly, her incapacity to affect the written contractual words.

CONCLUSION
Four hundred years have passed. And yet, it seems to me that so little has changed. Indeed,
one can doubt the practical significance of the rule, both then and now,224 or, the other way
around, one can admire the rule’s contribution to the functionality of contract law within the
commercial sphere.225 However, when looking through these women’s eyes – as this research
and analysis have sought to do – it becomes clear that the rule’s very presence, with all that it
represents, has inherently biased and injurious outcomes.
One may well admire Coke’s efforts to structure a rule of law in times of trouble as well as
his contribution to the stabilization of a society in times of change. But even so, through
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exposing the roots of the rule I have argued that centuries later we should reconsider the need
for the tree that they have sprouted. To my mind Nicolette, both as an individual and as a
representative of our times, should not have to suffer the misery of Isabel and her era.
Piecing together disparate historical and cultural materials, I have attempted to portray the
particular contexts of the birth of the very rule that strives to avoid context. I have tried not to
take the rule for granted, not to accept its existence as natural or neutral. I have treated
Coke’s words in the Countess of Rutland’s Case along the lines of New Historicism, as a
textual unit about texts and their importance and, more implicitly, about contexts and their
exclusion.
The fact that over four centuries this textual unit, which once formed the parol evidence rule,
has survived the changing times and has played a continuous role in a shifting contractual
doctrine is extremely meaningful: it bridges Nicolette and Isabel’s stories and transforms the
journey taken here from a mere search for the past to an exposure of a new understanding of
the present. This journey has, in a nutshell, the flavor of Foucault’s Genealogy226: nothing
that we know today is simply here, and therefore, in order to better understand the meaning
and necessity of the 21st century’s parol evidence rule, we better search where did it come
from.
My reading of the Case’s textual unit in and against its context suggests that it played a
double role: concurrently reflective and productive, simultaneously passive and active, both a
mirror and a torch. On the one hand, through close reading of the text, I have offered to view
the text as inertly representing the values that were highly admired within the legal culture of
Coke’s days. On the other hand, by exploring Coke’s motives I have suggested observing this
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text as an active player within the same legal culture, as one that was intentionally designed
to shape that legal culture.
I do hope that a deeper acquaintance with the circumstances of the birth of the parol evidence
rule, as offered here, makes it possible to better appreciate the motives that led to its
formation. It is, after all, a crucial advantage of the New Historicist practice: knowing the
particulars has the effect of de-mystifying the myth. My desire is that from this same wellinformed standpoint, it will now be easier to feel confident enough to admit the rule’s
artificiality and biased nature, and to reappraise its necessity. I also hope that this analysis
has produced a further argument, original and useful, against excessive formalist textualism
in present-day contract law.
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